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SUNDOWN AND YOU BETTER TAKE CARE: 
WHY SUNSET PROVISIONS HARM THE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY INDUSTRY AND 
VIOLATE TAX PRINCIPLES 
Abstract: The production tax credit (“PTC”) is the primary government 
incentive to promote renewable energy. In fact the PTC is necessary to 
make renewable energy cost competitive, to account for positive external-
ities, and to encourage private investment. These tax credits, however, are 
often subject to “sunset” or expiration dates, a trend in tax legislation. As 
a result, the PTC is only renewed for one to three years at a time. This re-
newal period is often shorter than the typical development cycle of a re-
newable energy project—for example, it is shorter than the three to seven 
years required to develop a wind farm. As such, the uncertainty of the 
PTC’s existence chills long-term investment. Further, to the extent that 
the PTC spurs growth, it occurs in “boom and bust” cycles that lead to 
higher costs and an unsustainable domestic renewable industry. These 
negative impacts on the renewable energy industry, however, are not off-
set by any countervailing tax policy. In fact, the complexity, inequity, and 
inefficiency that sunset provisions produce, particularly with respect to 
rent-seeking and enhanced lobbying, actually frustrate the fundamental 
goals of a tax system. 
Introduction 
 In the 2011 State of the Union Address, President Obama pro-
posed “reinventing” the nation’s economy by making America a leader 
in clean energy innovation.1 The President proposed government in-
vestment in clean energy innovation: “We’re telling America’s scientists 
and engineers that, if they assemble teams of the best minds in their 
fields and focus on the hardest problems in clean energy, we’ll fund the 
Apollo Projects of our time.”2 
                                                                                                                      
1 President Barack Obama, 2011 State of the Union Address ( Jan. 25, 2011), in 157 
Cong. Rec. H459 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2011). 
2 Id. (emphasis added). 
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 For supporters of renewable energy like President Obama, one ma-
jor hurdle to the development of clean, renewable energy is funding.3 
The U.S. government often uses the tax system to promote long-term 
investment in certain industries, one being renewable energy.4 Clean 
energy ameliorates climate change, lessens environmental derogation, 
and spurs economic growth, particularly in the manufacturing and con-
struction sectors.5 Also, it reduces dependence on fossil fuels, which 
have become increasingly dangerous and controversial to extract from 
the earth.6 The high costs of developing the clean energy industry, how-
ever, detract from these social benefits.7 Siting, grid access, and permit-
ting processes can be expensive and inhibiting.8 Most important high 
project risks chill such investment and raise the cost of capital.9 To close 
this price gap and incentivize investment, Congress crafted renewable 
energy incentives within the framework of the tax system, the most im-
                                                                                                                      
3 Id.; Joint Comm. on Taxation, Present Law and Background Relating to Tax 
Credits for Electricity Production from Renewable Sources 17 (2005) [hereinafter 
Joint Committee Report]. 
4 Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Income Taxation 2 (6th ed. 2010); see, e.g., Electricity 
Produced from Certain Renewable Sources, 26 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2010). 
5 Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Wind Energy for a New Era: An Agenda for the New 
President and Congress 2 (2009) [hereinafter Wind Agenda], available at http://www. 
newwindagenda.org/documents/Wind_Agenda_Report.pdf; Max Wei et al., Putting Re-
newables and Energy Efficiency to Work: How Many Jobs Can the Clean Energy Industry Generate in 
the U.S.?, 38 Energy Pol’y 919, 919 (2010); Renewables, Energy.gov, http:/www.energy. 
gov/energysources/renewables.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2011). 
6 Thomas Merrill & David Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed Pe-
troleum Fuel Stabilization Plan, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 17–21 (2010) (indicating three “famil-
iar” reasons to reduce consumption of petroleum: environmental degradation, national 
security, and urban sprawl/congestion); Christopher Riti, Comment, Three Sheets to the 
Wind: The Renewable Energy Production Tax Credits, Congressional Political Posturing, and an 
Unsustainable Energy Policy, 27 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 783, 784 (2010). Recent unrest in the 
Middle East and the 2010 Gulf oil spill are examples of the danger and controversy sur-
rounding fossil fuel extraction. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Deepwater Disaster—Some Liability 
Issues, 35 Tul. Mar. L.J. 125, 125, 130 (2010) (describing the inherent dangers of deepwa-
ter drilling and the Gulf oil spill in the summer of 2010); Clifford Krauss, Uncertainty Drives 
Up Oil Prices, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2011, at B1 (describing recent political unrest in the Mid-
dle East as a catalyst for higher oil prices). 
7 Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 16–17; John P. Garcia, ‘Green’ Corporate 
Tax Incentives—Wind Technologies, Corp. Tax’n, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 16, 16. 
8 Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 20% Wind by 2030, 
at 99 (2008) [hereinafter DOE Report], available at http://www.20percentwind.org/ 
20percent_wind_energy_report_revOct08.pdf; Jeffry S. Hinman, Note, Green Economic Recov-
ery Wind Energy Tax Policy After the Financial Crisis and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax 
Act of 2009, 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 35, 45 (2009). 
9 Adam C. Kobos, ARRA Alters the Landscape of Renewable Energy Project Finance, Corp. 
Tax’n, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 35, 35; Hinman, supra note 8, at 45. 
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portant of which is the Production Tax Credit (the “PTC”).10 The PTC 
is necessary to the renewable energy industry because it makes renew-
able projects more cost competitive and provides incentives for third-
party investors with taxable income to invest in such projects.11 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite this success, however, the PTC is not a permanent feature 
of the tax code.12 Instead, the PTC has been enacted subject to expira-
tion, or sunsetting, that requires periodic extensions every one to three 
years, a period far shorter than the typical development cycle of a re-
newable energy project.13 This Note argues that the frequency of sunset 
provisions in the PTC damages the renewable energy industry in the 
United States.14 When the credit expires, added renewable capacity 
drops precipitously.15 Sunset dates lead to a “boom and bust” cycle, in-
creasing demand before the sunset dates and increasing the cost of re-
newable energy in the manufacturing and construction sectors.16 Sun-
setting also creates investment risk, as the availability of the credit upon 
completion of the project is seldom certain.17 
 This Note argues that the PTC’s sunset provisions frustrate the pol-
icy of creating an equitable, simple, and efficient tax system, as they lead 
to inequitable lobbying battles, complicated amendments, and in-
creased transactional costs.18 These provisions also reduce the effective-
ness of the incentivizing function credit to correct the positive external-
ities of renewable energy production.19 Additionally, scholarly commen-
tary suggesting that sunset provisions promote long-term investment 
does not apply to the PTC and renewable energy.20 
 
10 26 U.S.C.A . § 45 (West 2010); Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 17–18. 
11 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8; Kobos, supra note 9, at 35. 
12 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(d). 
13 See infra notes 169–180 and accompanying text. 
14 See Ryan Wiser et al., Using Federal Production Tax Credit to Build a Du-
rable Market for Wind Power in the United States 5 (2007); Riti, supra note 6, at 
788; infra notes 215–350 and accompanying text. 
15 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8. 
16 See Wiser et al., supra note 14, at 5. 
17 Edward D. Kleinbard, Professor of Law, Univ. of S. Cal. Gould Sch. of Law, The 
Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Politi-
cal Process, Woodworth Memorial Lecture (May 7, 2009), in 36 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 23–
24 (2010). 
18 See William D. Andrews, Basic Federal Income Taxation 8–10 (Aspen 6th ed. 
2009) (1969); McDaniel, supra note 4, at 2–3; infra notes 293–350 and accompanying text. 
19 See Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 17–18; Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 
23. 
20 See George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability and Fiscal Re-
straint, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 174, 245 (2009). 
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 The Low-Income Housing Credit (the “LIHTC”) is an analogous 
credit that promotes affordable housing, and which this Note uses as a 
tool for comparison with the PTC.21 This credit, unlike the PTC, is a 
permanent feature of the tax code.22 Its permanency enhances its suc-
cess, primarily because real estate developers and investors can rely on 
its continued existence.23 
 This Note argues that promotion of the renewable energy industry 
requires a permanent extension of the PTC, similar to the extension of 
the LIHTC.24 This credit is necessary to make renewable projects cost 
competitive, and investors financing renewable projects need to be sure 
of the PTC’s continued existence to minimize investment risks.25 With-
out the PTC, renewable energy production would drop significantly, 
and manufacturing and construction industries would suffer.26 Without 
its extension, the incentivizing function of the tax credits cannot reach 
its full potential.27 
 Part I of this Note establishes the importance of renewable energy 
production.28 It further provides the statutory details of the PTC and its 
monetization.29 Part II gives an overview of the use of sunset provisions 
in tax policy and their impact on the renewable energy industry; the 
Part then discusses how eliminating such provisions from the LIHTC 
enhanced investment in low-income housing.30 Part III establishes that 
sunset dates frustrate the PTC’s ability to promote long-term invest-
ment in the renewable industry; the Part then utilizes the LIHTC and 
the affordable housing industry to illustrate the potential benefits of 
                                                                                                                      
21 26 U.S.C.A. § 42 (West 2010). 
22 Compare id. (indicating no expiration date of the credit), with 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(d) 
(West 2010) (indicating an expiration date for wind facilities of January 1, 2013). 
23 Kirk McClure, The Low Income Housing Tax Credit as an Aid to Housing Finance: How 
Well Has It Worked?, 11 Housing Pol’y Debate, no. 1, 2000, at 91, 96. 
24 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8; Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23; infra notes 215–
350 and accompanying text. 
25 Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23. 
26 Energy Info. Admin., Analysis of Five Selected Tax Provisions of the Confer-
ence Energy Bill of 2003, at 4 (2003) [hereinafter EIA Report], available at http://tonto. 
eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/ceb/pdf/sroiaf(2004)01.pdf (noting that the PTC “supports 
significant growth in generation from wind” and that “[b]y 2025, the level of wind generation 
with the PTC extension is 50% more”); Navigant Consulting, Inc., Economic Impacts of 
Tax Credit Expiration 3, 20–22 (2008) [hereinafter Economic Impacts], available at 
http://www.solar-nation.org/pdf/Navigant-Tax-Credit-Impact.pdf. 
27 Wiser et al., supra note 14, at 5; Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23. 
28 See infra notes 39–69 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 70–111 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 112–214 and accompanying text. 
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making the PTC permanent.31 Finally, Part IV argues that sunset provi-
sions in the PTC undermine the tax system’s goals of simplicity, equity, 
and efficiency.32 
I. Incentivizing Renewable Energy in the United States 
 Rather than promote certain behavior through mandates or direct 
subsidies, the federal government often uses the tax system to promote 
long-term investment in industries that serve important social functions 
but suffer significant economic barriers to market entry and participa-
tion.33 This Part establishes why and how Congress promotes renewable 
energy through the tax system.34 Part I.A first addresses the policy rea-
sons for incentivizing renewable energy, given both the benefits of and 
barriers to the industry.35 Part I.B details the two tax credits that incen-
tivize renewable energy development and how they operate in the in-
dustry.36 Because renewable energy is a broad concept, this Note fo-
cuses on the production of wholesale electricity from renewable 
sources.37 Furthermore, most of the discussion refers to wind power, as 
it has become the most widespread and cost-competitive renewable en-
ergy source.38 
A. The Policy Rationale for Incentivizing Renewable Energy 
1. The Effects of Renewable Energy 
 Congress incentivizes long-term investment in renewable energy to 
promote environmental protection, economic growth, and national se-
                                                                                                                      
31 See infra notes 215–292 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 293–350 and accompanying text. 
33 See Andrews, supra note 18, at 7; McDaniel, supra note 4, at 2. Some tax scholars 
consider tax incentives problematic. See Andrews, supra note 18, at 9 (“Creating special 
incentives not generated by the market alone . . . is more problematic.”); Eric T. Laity, The 
Corporation as Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures and Institutional Design, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 
411, 468 (2008) (criticizing the lack of government oversight when private investment 
serves public needs). 
34 See infra notes 39–111 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 39–69 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 70–111 and accompanying text. 
37 Other sources of electricity, like coal and petroleum, rely on a finite amount of fuel, 
whereas renewable sources are replenished through Earth’s natural processes, namely wind, 
solar, geothermal, and biomass. Clean Energy Glossary: Renewable Energy, epa.gov, http:// 
www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/glossary.html#R (last visited Apr. 22, 2011). This 
Note does not discuss renewable fuel for transportation. 
38 See DOE Report, supra note 8, at 7. 
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curity.39 Clean, renewable energy likely reduces pollution and mitigates 
climate change because renewable energy sources do not emit toxins or 
carbon dioxide (the main cause of climate change) into the air or water, 
unlike coal and other fossil fuels.40 
 Furthermore, some posit that developing domestic renewable en-
ergy promotes energy security.41 Increased investment in domestic re-
newable energy projects may also reduce fossil fuel dependence and 
foreign oil imports.42 Currently, U.S. energy production is highly de-
pendent on fossil fuels: 83% of electricity consumed derives from fossil 
fuels and the United States imports 37% of this fossil fuel energy.43 As 
such, these energy sources may be susceptible to unstable political situ-
ations and price volatility.44 Increased domestic renewable sources 
could ameliorate this dependence.45 
 Finally, and of particular interest in the current economic reces-
sion, renewable energy investment creates economic growth.46 Renew-
                                                                                                                      
39 See infra notes 40–49 and accompanying text. Promoting renewable energy in the 
United States has garnered support across the political spectrum. Clifford Krauss, Alterna-
tive Energy Suddenly Faces Headwinds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 2008, at B1. 
40 Clean Energy Glossary: Renewable Energy, supra note 37; Renewables, supra note 5. Coal, 
which makes up twenty-nine percent of U.S. energy production, emits sulfur, nitrogen 
oxides, and particulate matter into the atmosphere, causing a host of environmental and 
health repercussions. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., March 2011: Monthly Energy Review 
5 (2010) [hereinafter Energy Review], available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/totalenergy/ 
data/monthly/pdf/mer.pdf; see Robert B. Finkelman et al., Health Impacts of Coal and Coal 
Use: Possible Solutions, 50 Int’l J. Coal Geology 425, 425 (2002). See generally Scientific Con-
sensus on Global Warming, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://ucsusa.org/ssi/cli- 
mate-change/scientific-consensus-on.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2011) (describing consen-
sus among scientists that human emissions of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping 
emissions is causing climate change). 
41 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 7, at 16 (“These renewable energy sources are not only 
cleaner, but also much less susceptible to the uncertainties of trade embargos, production 
limitations, natural disasters such as hurricanes, and general price speculation and ma-
nipulation.”). 
42 Id.; see Energy Review, supra note 40, at 3, 8. 
43 Energy Review, supra note 40, at 3. 
44 Riti, supra note 6, at 784 (noting that foreign oil dependence makes the United States 
vulnerable to “political posturing, price volatility, and technological instability”). The United 
States expends a lot of resources securing energy in the Persian Gulf region. See CNA Corp., 
Powering America’s Defense: Energy and the Risks to National Security 7 (2009), 
available at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/Powering%20Americas%20Defense.pdf. 
The recent unrest in Libya particularly illustrates the fragile nature of the fossil fuel market 
and oil prices. Jad Mouawad & Clifford Krauss, Tremors from Libya Contribute to Oil Price Cycles, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2011, at B1. 
45 See Garcia, supra note 7, at 16 (establishing that the price of renewable energy is 
more predictable and the sources are less susceptible to political uncertainties, evidenced 
by the gas price spike in 2008). 
46 See Wei et al., supra note 5, at 919. 
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able energy creates more jobs per unit of energy than coal and natural 
gas; aggressive development of renewable projects could yield over four 
million full-time-equivalent job years by 2030.47 Furthermore, because of 
increased gains in global investment, some refer to renewable energy as 
a “new worldwide industry.”48 As such, domestic production of renew-
able energy and manufacturing of components may assist the United 
States in maintaining its globally competitive status.49 
 Environmental protection, climate change mitigation, energy secu-
rity, and job creation all represent positive externalities to the develop-
ment of renewable energy.50 Because monetary gains from renewable 
energy projects do not compensate for these positive externalities, and 
because high costs and risks frustrate profitability of renewable energy 
development, there is arguably a market failure that may warrant gov-
ernment intervention.51 
2. Barriers to the Development of Renewable Energy 
 As with any nascent technology, many impediments exist to the 
development of renewable energy.52 High costs and high risks chill in-
vestment in renewable energy, creating a need for government incen-
                                                                                                                      
47 Id. Four million job years represents 400,000 jobs per year for ten years. See id. Accord-
ing to the American Wind Energy Association, achieving twenty percent wind energy by 2030 
(the DOE’s goal) would stimulate 150,000 domestic jobs, including manufacturing, installa-
tion, operations, maintenance, and management. Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8. Fur-
thermore, the industry would indirectly generate 350,000 domestic jobs, through steel work-
ers, electrical manufacturing workers, accountants, lawyers, and other positions due to local 
spending. Id. As of March 2011, of the 14,060,000 unemployed persons, 1,475,000 are in the 
manufacturing industry and 1,695,000 are in construction. News Release, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Situation—March 2011, tbls.A-13, A-14 (Apr. 
1, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. Both classes of work-
ers would benefit from these domestic jobs. See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8. A capable 
work force and empty factories could easily transition to wind energy component production. 
See id. 
48 PEW Charitable Trusts, Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race? Growth, 
Competition and Opportunity in the World’s Largest Economies 4 (2009), available 
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Global_warming/ 
G-20%20Report.pdf. In 2009, the United States slipped into second place behind China in 
overall renewable energy investment. Id. 
49 See id. 
50 See Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 17–18. 
51 See id. 
52 See DOE Report, supra note 8, at 99; Hinman, supra note 8, at 44–46 (enumerating 
many impediments to renewable energy development including local opposition, siting 
difficulties, and other risk-enhancing factors). 
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tives.53 The high initial investment in the infrastructure is prohibitive to 
many developers.54 Additionally, siting of renewable projects introduces 
costly obstacles: wind farms, for example, are often in remote, rural, or 
offshore areas, and connecting to the power grid requires substantial 
infrastructure investment and permitting requirements.55 Further-
more, local opposition often impedes the development of both trans-
mission lines and wind farms.56 State agencies are hesitant to approve 
projects if they do not afford substantial benefit to intrastate resi-
dents.57 On top of all this, environmental review of renewal projects 
can be extremely long: if the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) applies, permitting may involve a multi-year process or even 
longer if opposed.58 For these reasons, the length of a commercial-scale 
terrestrial wind project could take three to five years to complete, and 
offshore projects take approximately five to seven years, meaning there 
will be significant delays in an investor’s realization of profit.59 
                                                                                                                     
 The high risk of renewable projects can also impede industry in-
vestment and make capital costs prohibitively high.60 First, intermit-
tency in energy production due to natural processes threatens some 
renewable energy sources and causes trepidation in the investment of 
these projects.61 Second, when the price of fossil fuels is relatively low, 
 
53 Hinman, supra note 8, at 44–46 (establishing that renewable energy projects intro-
duce a number of risk elements). 
54 Investing in Wind Powered Systems, House-Energy, http://www.house-energy.com/ 
Wind/Costs-Wind.htm (last visited May 17, 2011) (indicating that a single 1.5 megawatt 
turbine costs $1 million, a typical wind farm costs $20 million, and offshore wind projects 
can be 30–50% higher). 
55 See DOE Report, supra note 8, at 95, 99, 106; Hinman, supra note 8, at 45. 
56 See DOE Report, supra note 8, at 99, 106. 
57 See id. at 99. 
58 E-mail from Dennis Duffy, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Energy Mgmt. Inc., to 
author ( Jan. 21, 2011, 12:52 EST) (on file with author). Duke Energy abandoned its three-
turbine offshore wind “demonstration project” off the Carolinas once an Environmental 
Impact Statement was required under NEPA. John Downey, Duke Energy Will Not Build Wind 
Turbines in Pamlico Sound, offshoreWIND.biz (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.offshorewind. 
biz/2010/08/20/duke-energy-will-not-build-wind-turbines-in-pamlico-sound-usa/. 
59 E-mail from Dennis Duffy to author, supra note 58; David Vander Leest, How Long 
Does It Take to Build a Wind Farm?, Prelude LLC Wind Farms, http://preludellcwindfarms. 
com/faq.html (last visited May 17, 2011). 
60 Clifford Krauss, Alternative Energy Suddenly Faces Headwinds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 
2008, at B1. Weak capital markets can also be a major obstruction. Id. 
61 See DOE Report, supra note 8, at 93–94, 99. Wind and solar in particular are subject 
to conditions beyond human control. Id. at 93. 
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economic incentives to develop non-fossil fuel energy sources decline.62 
Furthermore, in today’s deregulated power markets, the variable costs 
of the marginal provider of electricity in each hour, typically natural 
gas-fired plants, dictates the market price of all electricity; therefore, 
when the marginal providers can provide electricity at much lower 
prices, the market revenues available to renewable energy also decline, 
threatening its economic viability.63 
 Third, selling renewable electricity to public utilities also poses 
challenges and risks.64 Most public utilities attempt to minimize the 
near-term cost of electricity to consumers, but the price per kilowatt 
hour of electricity for renewable energy is often more expensive than 
the short-term market price, particularly during periods with low fossil 
fuel prices.65 As such, it may be difficult to procure a long-term con-
tract with public utilities to distribute and sell the renewable power, 
and, without the revenue certainty that such a commitment provides, it 
is difficult to obtain construction financing.66 Lastly, inconsistent politi-
cal incentives to promote renewable energy introduce additional risk by 
creating uncertainty regarding the continued existence of tax credits, 
which are necessary to make renewable projects economically viable.67 
 Clearly, increased risk, cost, and length of renewable projects may 
chill private investment.68 Given the social utility of a strong renewable 
                                                                                                                      
62 See Hinman, supra note 8, at 36 (establishing that low fossil fuel prices and limited 
political support thwarted renewable energy development); Matthew L. Wald & Tom Zeller 
Jr., Cost of Green Power Makes Projects Tougher Sell, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2010, at A1. 
63 Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 10. 
64 See id.; infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
65 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006) (“All rates and charges made, de-
manded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale 
of electric energy . . . shall be just and reasonable . . . .” (emphasis added)); see, e.g., Mass. 
Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1033–34 (Mass. 1994) (holding that the 
Department of Public Utilities exceeded its power when it considered environmental ex-
ternalities in the selection of contracts with wholesale electricity companies, when such 
consideration resulted in higher costs to consumers). 
66 See Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 10. State renewable portfolio stan-
dards may serve to ameliorate this problem by requiring public utilities to purchase a cer-
tain amount of electricity from renewable sources. See Timothy Duane, Greening the Grid: 
Implementing Climate Change Policy Through Energy Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards, and 
Strategic Transmission System Investments, 34 Vt. L. Rev. 711, 712 (2010). 
67 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8 (indicating drops in installed wind capacity dur-
ing expired production tax credits); Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23–24; infra notes 112–
350 and accompanying text. 
68 Hinman, supra note 8, at 36. 
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energy industry, these obstructions to development justify tax incen-
tives that encourage investment in the renewable energy industry.69 
B. Use of the Income Tax System to Incentivize Private  
Investment in Renewable Energy 
 Congress can use either tax credits or deductions to promote in-
vestment in a particular industry: tax credits provide dollar-for-dollar 
reductions in income tax liability, whereas tax deductions only reduce 
taxable income and lower tax liability in proportion to the applicable 
tax rate.70 U.S. incentives for renewable energy take the form of tax 
credits, specifically the PTC71 and the Investment Tax Credit (ITC).72 
The PTC is the dominant tax incentive in the industry and is thus the 
principal subject of this Note; the ITC has only recently played a more 
major role.73 
 These tax credits offset the higher costs of producing renewable 
energy, reducing the cost gap between renewable energy and traditional 
power generation sources, such as coal and natural gas.74 For example, 
under certain conditions, use of the PTC can cause wind-generated 
electricity to be sold at approximately six cents per kilowatt hour, which 
is approaching cost competitiveness with coal-fired electricity (with a 
typical short-term price of three to five cents per kilowatt hour).75 As a 
result of this reduced after-tax price, investors may be more willing to 
commit long-term to renewable projects.76 A carbon tax would have the 
                                                                                                                      
69 Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 2; Hinman, supra note 8, at 36; Riti, supra note 6, at 
784. 
70 General Business Credit, 26 U.S.C.A. § 38 (West 2010); Adjusted Gross Income, 26 
U.S.C.A. § 62(a), (b) (West 2010). 
71 26 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2010). 
72 Id. § 48. These are not the only methods of incentivizing renewable energy. See, e.g., 
New Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, 26 U.S.C.A § 54(C) (West 2010). Certain qualified 
energy property may also be eligible for accelerated depreciation, which allows the tax-
payer to depreciate its tax basis in qualifying investments over a five-year period. 26 
U.S.C.A. § 168(k) (West 2010). As such, losses accumulate quickly and these losses de-
crease the taxpayer’s taxable income. See Roberta F. Mann, Back to the Future: Recommenda-
tions and Predictions for Greener Tax Policy, 88 Or. L. Rev. 355, 388 (2009). 
73 See Kobos, supra note 9, at 35 (indicating that Congress made the ITC available for 
PTC-qualifying facilities in 2009, providing more options for renewable energy investors). 
74 See Riti, supra note 6, at 788. 
75 John Goff, How a Fresh Crop of CFOs Is Propelling the Alternative-Fuels Industry, CFO 
( Jul. 1, 2006), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7108959/1/c_7129649. 
76 Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 13 (“If investors in wind facilities . . . can 
expect to contract for prices close to those of natural gas facilities or coal facilities, the 
existence of the production tax credit may make investments in renewable resource elec-
tric generation facilities attractive to potential investors.”). 
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same economic impact of filling the gap between the marginal cost of 
renewable energy and fossil fuels while also raising revenue.77 Political 
opposition to the carbon tax, however, could result in a less than “opti-
mal” tax and therefore decreased efficacy in closing the gap in marginal 
costs.78 
 Nonetheless, wind energy has had an annual growth rate of thirty 
percent since 1990.79 Many in the industry attribute this growth in re-
newable projects to the PTC.80 During the years that the PTC was al-
lowed to expire, new wind project installations dropped precipitously; 
studies indicate that future expirations would result in similar, drastic 
reductions.81 
1. Tax Credits for the Production of Renewable Energy 
 Congress created the PTC in 1992 to reduce dependence on for-
eign oil and incentivize the production of renewable energy.82 The PTC 
is available for renewable electricity produced for sale to a third party 
from qualified renewable energy resources, such as wind and solar.83 
The credit is equal to the product of 2.2 cents (adjusted for inflation) 
and the kilowatt hours of electricity (1) produced by the taxpayer, (2) 
from “qualified energy resources,” (3) during the ten-year credit period 
beginning on the date the facility was placed in service, and (4) sold in 
                                                                                                                      
77 Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. 
Rev. 499, 500 (2009). 
78 Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted Households 
and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 33, 93 n.301 (2010). 
79 See Austin Conner, Twenty Percent Wind Energy by 2030: Keys to Meeting the DOE’s Goal, 5 
Envtl. & Energy L. & Pol’y J. 130, 130 (2010). 
80 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8; Kobos, supra note 9, at 35. Although those in 
the renewable energy industry have an interest in promoting the PTC, data regarding the 
impact of the PTC on added capacity of wind energy provide support for their view. See 
EIA Report, supra note 26, at 4; U.S. Installed Wind Capacity and Wind Project Locations, U.S. 
Dept. of Energy, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_installed_capacity.asp (last 
visited May 17, 2011) [hereinafter Wind Capacity and Projects]. 
81 Economic Impacts, supra note 26, at 20–22; EIA Report, supra note 26, at 4; Wind 
Agenda, supra note 5, at 8; see also infra notes 181–188 and accompanying text (describing 
added wind capacity over the past decade). 
82 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1914, 106 Stat. 2776, 3020–22 (co-
dified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 38–39, 45 (West 2010)); In Support of the Conference 
Report to H.R. 776, The Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act, 138 Cong. Rec. E3214 (daily 
ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Hon. Harris W. Fawell of Illinois). 
83 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(a). “[Q]ualified energy resources” for the PTC include: wind, closed 
and open loop biomass, geothermal, solar, small irrigation power, municipal solid waste, 
qualified hydropower, and marine/hydrokinetic. Id. § 45(c)(1). 
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a qualified sale to a third party.84 This amount directly reduces the tax-
payer’s income tax liability.85 For instance, if a qualified renewable en-
ergy company produces ten thousand kilowatt hours of renewable en-
ergy and sells it to a public utility (or other the third party), it would 
receive a tax credit of twenty-two thousand dollars.86 A similar calcula-
tion could occur each year for ten years.87 
 The PTC encourages investment in wind projects that operate suc-
cessfully over the long term, as the electricity must actually be produced 
and sold to a third party to realize the tax credit, and so construction 
alone is not sufficient to obtain the PTC.88 This requirement shifts pro-
ject risk away from the federal government to the owners and develop-
ers of the facilities.89 Therefore, the tax credit may not be fully utilized if 
production dwindles or project complications occur, such as long-term 
production outages or inability to deliver energy to the grid.90 
 The ITC is another renewable energy tax credit that was previously 
only available for smaller projects but has recently become important to 
large, PTC-qualifying renewable energy facilities.91 An ITC amounts to 
thirty percent of the eligible cost of any renewable energy property 
placed in service during a taxable year—this amount directly reduces 
income tax liability.92 Furthermore, this credit reduces the depreciable 
basis of the property.93 The availability of the ITC to PTC-qualifying fa-
cilities provides additional options for investors.94 By electing to claim 
the ITC, rather than the PTC, investors are not exposed to the risks of 
                                                                                                                      
84 Id. § 45(a). The cents-per-kilowatt-hour figure is adjusted for inflation yearly. Id. 
§ 45(b)(2). The price indicated (2.2 cents) and the ten-year credit period, however, are 
reduced by half for certain types of generation. Id. § 45(b)(4)(A)–(B). 
85 Business Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C.A. § 38(a) (West 2010). 
86 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(a). 
87 See id. 
88 Id. § 45(a)(2)(B); see Hinman, supra note 8, at 56–57. 
89 See Hinman, supra note 8, at 56. 
90 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(a). This provision was drafted with the tax credit abuses of the 
wind boom in California in mind and was designed to avoid frivolous tax shelters. See 
Hinman, supra note 8, at 55. 
91 American Relief and Reinvestment Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 111–5, § 1102, 123 Stat. 115, 
320 (2009) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45) (making the ITC available to PTC-
qualifying facilities). Additionally, a grant in lieu of the ITC was also offered for particu-
larly capital-starved projects. Id. § 1603, 123 Stat. at 364. 
92 Energy Credit, 26 U.S.C.A. § 48(a)(1)–(2). 
93 Id. § 48(d)(3)(B). Basis is the taxpayer’s recoverable capital investment in an asset 
and is used to determine gain or loss realized with respect to that asset. McDaniel, supra 
note 4, at 479. Depreciation is the reduction of the basis of an asset used in a trade or 
business (e.g., a wind turbine) through amortization, and this depreciation may be de-
ducted from taxable income. 26 U.S.C. § 167(a) (2006). 
94 See Garcia, supra note 7, at 18. 
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decreased demand or production complications, as the sale of electricity 
is not required to realize the ITC.95 Furthermore, the time commitment 
to the project need only be five years to capture the full credit, as com-
pared to the ten-year commitment necessary under the PTC.96 Al-
though this Note focuses on the PTC, the ITC may have increasing im-
portance to renewable energy projects if it remains applicable to larger 
facilities.97 
M
“taxpayer,” and developers, the experts in renewable energy, maintain 
                                                                                                                     
2. onetization Challenges 
 Typically, the PTC requires private equity investment to be mone-
tized, specifically through tax equity investors.98 To realize fully the ben-
efit of a tax credit, the taxpayer must have sufficient tax liability.99 De-
velopers of renewable energy, however, may not expect to have sufficient 
federal income tax liability for the next ten years, and yet equity is nec-
essary at the beginning stages of the project.100 Therefore, utilization of 
these tax credits typically requires a third-party investor, called a tax eq-
uity investor.101 The tax equity investor provides equity to the project 
and becomes the “taxpayer” benefitting from the tax credit over the ten-
year credit period.102 To maintain their “taxpayer” status, tax equity in-
vestors must maintain an ownership interest in the renewable project.103 
Therefore, investors and developers structure special deals to ensure 
that tax equity investors obtain ownership of the property to become the 
 
95 See Conner, supra note 79, at 134. Compare 26 U.S.C.A. § 48(a) (requiring the tax-
payer place the facility in service), with id. § 45(a) (requiring the taxpayer sell the electric-
ity to a third party). This difference, however, frustrates the PTC’s purpose of ensuring 
successful renewable projects. See Hinman, supra note 8, at 56–57. 
96 Compare 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(2)(A)(ii) (permitting the PTC to be collected over a 
ten-year period), with 26 U.S.C. § 50(a) (2006) (mandating a five-year vesting period for 
business tax credits). 
97 See Kobos, supra note 9, at 35; Hinman, supra note 8, at 68. 
98 See infra notes 99–106 and accompanying text. 
99 Business Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C.A. § 38(a) (West 2010). 
100 See Kobos, supra note 9, at 37–38. 
101 See id. 
102 Id. Typically, the parties will create a limited partnership or limited liability com-
pany for tax purposes because neither form is recognized as a taxable entity; as such, part-
ners are treated as owners of their allocable share. Id. 
103 Id. As such, only the owner of the facility is able to receive the PTC, and tax equity 
investors who want to take advantage of the PTC must maintain an ownership interest in 
the facility. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967, 967; Kobos, supra note 9, at 37–38. Leas-
ing or debt transactions will not qualify the lessee or lender to receive the tax credit be-
cause the lessee or lender would not have an ownership interest in the facility. See 26 
U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(2)(A) (West 2010); Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967, 968. 
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operational control over the project.104 With respect to renewable en-
ergy, only a few dozen investors execute these complicated deals.105 The 
industry and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) developed complex 
ownership agreements allowing the project to monetize the PTC by ef-
fectively allocating the tax benefit to an equity investor.106 
 Because these programs encourage private investment by third-
party investors, the effectiveness of the tax credits is vulnerable to 
weaknesses in the capital market and to factors that compromise the 
certainty of investments.107 The recession in 2008, with depleted credit 
markets, a weakened financial sector, and decreased energy prices, re-
vealed some of the limitations of tax credits to spur development in re-
newable energy.108 
 Furthermore, investors require the continued existence of the 
PTC in order to invest in renewable projects with confidence that the 
benefits will be available when the project is operational and connected 
                                                                                                                      
104 See Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967, 967–69; Kobos, supra note 9, at 38. 
105 Patrick E. Groomes & Paul J. Astolfi, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Treasury Grants for Renewable 
Energy Projects, Law 360 (2009), available at http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/ 
3B81385AC3D517333AC64EEE3DD0EF35.pdf. Monetizing the ITC, however, can be achieved 
with more traditional syndication structures, as the ITC does not require that the taxpayer 
produce and sell electricity over a credit period. See Kobos, supra note 9, at 39. Compare 26 
U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (requiring that the taxpayer produce electricity to capture the credit), 
with id. § 48(a) (requiring that the taxpayer place property in service to receive tax credit). 
Restrictions in 26 U.S.C. § 50(a), however, require that the taxpayer cannot sell the facility for 
five years. 26 U.S.C. § 50(a) (2006). 
106 See Hinman, supra note 8, at 59. The IRS approved one type of syndication structure 
in Revenue Procedure 2007-65, specifically for wind energy projects, and provides guid-
ance and a “safe harbor” in structuring these deals. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967, 
967. To comply with Revenue Procedure 2007-65, the tax equity investor becomes a limited 
partner in the development, but typically with a maximum of 99% ownership interest. Id. 
at 968. The investor, therefore, receives 99% of the PTC benefits and 99% of the deprecia-
tion benefits. Id. at 968–69. The developer, who will be operating and maintaining the 
project, becomes a general partner with a 1% ownership interest. Id. According to 2007-65, 
the developer must maintain a minimum 1% interest in income, gain, loss, deduction, and 
credit throughout the term of the partnership. Id. As a result, the investor is the taxpayer, 
satisfying the statutory requirement under § 45. Id. The developer, however, maintains a 
stake in the company, and therefore it is an equity infusion, not a debt transaction. Id. 
Then, after the PTC’s ten-year statutory period, the ownership will “flip”: the investor now 
maintains a 5% ownership in the project and the owner takes on the remaining 95%. Id. In 
accordance with Revenue Procedure 2007-65, the investor cannot flip down to less than 
5%. Id. After the flip, the developer typically has a purchase option at fair market value for 
the remaining 5%. Id. 
107 Mann, supra note 72, at 388. 
108 See Bus. Cycle Dating Comm. of the Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Determi-
nation of the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity 1 (2008), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/dec2008.pdf (establishing that the recession began in 2008); Mann, supra  
note 72, at 387. 
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to the grid.109 Todd Raba, the president of MidAmerican Energy Com-
pany, has articulated this point: “We [could not] risk final acquisition 
and installation of the turbines without the PTC being restored, as the 
project would not have met the cost requirements of the Iowa Utility 
Board.”110 Other risks as well may chill investment, such as unpredict-
able market shifts in costs and revenues, local opposition, and change 
in government policies.111 
II. Sunset Provisions in Tax Policy 
 Despite the necessity of the PTC to investors, it is not a permanent 
feature of the tax code and has been subject to frequent expirations 
and renewals due to sunset dates.112 Sunset dates are built-in expiration 
dates for laws that mandate affirmative congressional action to renew 
that law.113 Section A of this Part provides a history of sunset dates in 
Congress, their theoretical justifications, and the scholarly debate sur-
rounding them.114 Next, Section B discusses the successive use of sunset 
dates in the PTC and the effects of sunset dates on the industry’s use of 
the PTC.115 Finally, Section C introduces the Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC), which, despite sunsetting in the nascent stages of the 
credit, has become a permanent feature in the tax code.116 
                                                                                                                      
109 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8; Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23–24. 
110 Clean Energy: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Hearings of the S. Finance Comm., 
110th Cong. 13 (2007). 
111 See supra notes 52–69 and accompanying text (describing risks of renewable pro-
jects). 
112 American Relief and Reinvestment Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1101, 123 Stat. 115, 
319 (2009) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2010)) (renewing the PTC for 
three years); Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 201, 120 Stat. 
2922, 2944 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45) (renewing the PTC for one year); 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1301, 119 Stat. 594, 986–87 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45) (renewing the PTC for two years); Working Families Tax 
Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 313, 118 Stat. 1166, 1181 (codified as amended 
at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45) (renewing the PTC for one year); Job Creation and Worker Assistance 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 603, 116 Stat. 21, 59 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C.A. § 45) (renewing the PTC for less than two years); Tax Relief Extension Act of 
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 507, 113 Stat. 1860, 1922 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 45) (renewing the PTC for two years); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 
§ 1914, 106 Stat. 2776, 3020 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 38–39, 45 (West 
2010)) (establishing the PTC initially for six and a half years). 
113 Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of 
Public Authority 309 (1969). Sunset dates were formerly called “duration clauses.” Ja-
cob Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 247, 247 (2007). 
114 See infra notes 117–163 and accompanying text. 
115 See infra notes 164–204 and accompanying text. 
116 See infra notes 205–214 and accompanying text. 
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A. History and Debate over Sunset Dates 
 Sunset dates have a long history in U.S. legislation, both in theory 
and in practice.117 The recent surge of sunset provisions in the past 
decade has sparked much debate about their value.118 
1. Political Theory of Sunset Provisions 
 Sunset provisions are expiration dates on laws—a “sunsetting” law 
is only effective for a certain period of time.119 The concept and con-
troversy of expiring legislation in the United States harkens back to the 
founding fathers.120 Theorists understood sunset provisions to subject 
laws to periodic review.121 Such a built-in review mechanism would hold 
the legislature accountable and shift the legislative burden to those who 
sought to renew the law, rather than to those who sought to overturn 
it.122 
 Over the past forty years Congress has increasingly used sunset 
provisions, particularly in tax legislation.123 The contemporary theory 
of sunsetting originates with the political theorist Theodore Lowi, who 
in 1969 proposed that all laws creating federal agencies be subject to 
expiration after five to ten years.124 Lowi also posited that sunsetting 
encourages innovative legislation and replacement of stagnant, ineffec-
tive programs and decreased special interest influence.125 This theory, 
however, proved unsuccessful particularly at the state level due to lack 
of public participation, enhanced special interest lobbying, and costly 
                                                                                                                      
117 Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the 
Tax Code, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 335, 338 (2006). 
118 Compare id. at 340 (criticizing sunset provisions), with Yin, supra note 20, at 180 
(supporting sunset provisions). 
119 Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code: A Critical Evaluation and Pre-
scriptions for the Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 656, 657 (2007). 
120 See Kysar, supra note 117, at 350 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James 
Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 3, 8–9 (Paul Leicester 
Ford ed., 1904)) (indicating that Thomas Jefferson advocated for the sunset system, as “no 
society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law”). 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at 354. 
123 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax 
Legislative Process, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 562 (1998). 
124 Lowi, supra note 113, at 309. President Carter in particular adopted this philoso-
phy. See Kysar, supra note 117, at 353. Judge Guido Calabresi, however, criticized sunset law 
as “a mechanical doctrine linked solely to time.” Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for 
the Age of Statutes 61 (1982). 
125 Kysar, supra note 117, at 352. 
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review processes.126 Furthermore, it was primarily used in the tax code 
on the federal level, rather than for agency legislation.127 
 The use of sunsetting has grown even more prolifically since 
2000.128 Congress initially used sunset provisions narrowly for targeted 
tax credits; extenders or sunset clauses, however, have become in-
grained in the tax code.129 Extensive sunsetting in the tax code began 
with the Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001—all of 
that act’s tax provisions were “sunsetted” by Congress.130 
 Scholars posit that a primary reason for increased use of sunsetting 
is to achieve budgetary goals, as temporary tax provisions have less im-
pact on tax expenditures.131 This increase in sunsetting, then, appears 
to have taken place for reasons not predicted by Lowi’s theory of sunset 
provisions.132 Supporters argue that the provisions reduce spending, 
encourage political accountability, and promote consideration of the 
actual cost of legislation, thereby preventing flaws in accounting for 
                                                                                                                      
126 See id. at 353–55 (summarizing state programs that utilized widespread sunsetting of 
all legislation and indicating the failure of those programs, mostly on account of lack of 
public participation). 
127 Id. at 358. 
128 See Viswanathan, supra note 119, at 657. This trend commenced with the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 21–22, 28, 31, 42, 47, and 49–50 U.S.C.). Con-
gress sunsetted this Act because it was emergency legislation, and presumably would be 
repealed when no emergency existed. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, 
National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 675, 
696 (2004). 
129 Kysar, supra note 117, at 358–59 (characterizing the ITC and the work opportunity 
tax credit as targeted tax credits temporarily enacted to “combat interim needs and diffi-
culties”); Viswanathan, supra note 119, at 657 (“The majority of the tax cuts enacted in 
2001, 2002, and 2003 will expire before 2011.”). 
130 Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 
38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Kysar, supra note 117, at 338; 
see also Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 103, 
117 Stat. 752, 754 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 63 (West 2010)) (sunsetting 
Alternative Minimum Tax provisions). The estate tax was also subject to a sunset provision 
and consequently expired in 2010, causing a “train wreck” in the estate planning industry. 
Beth Shapiro Kaufman, 2010: The Anatomy of a Train Wreck, 37 Est. Plan. 42, 42 (2010). 
131 See Kysar, supra note 117, at 359. One such budgetary rule is the pay-as-you-go 
(PAYGO) rule. Id. at 360. By implementing sunset provisions, fewer offsetting revenues are 
required if the tax cut/credit has a shorter life. Id. at 360–61; see also Cheryl D. Block, Pa-
thologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 863, 874 
(2002) (noting that taxation is an integral part of the budgetary process). 
132 Lowi, supra note 113, at 352 (theorizing that sunset dates would cause greater legis-
lative oversight and more innovative legislative programs). 
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permanent legislation.133 Further, sunset provisions impact budget fo-
recasting: by sunsetting the PTC, the budget forecast need only account 
for projects likely to come into service during the one or two years of 
the current credit extension period, rather than the total cost of all 
projects placed in service over the ten-year budgetary process.134 Crit-
ics, however, argue that sunset provisions reduce political accountability 
by underestimating revenue needs and reducing reliability of revenue 
projections, and that they encourage congressional misconduct by in-
troducing with each renewal lobbying opportunities for potential cam-
paign contributions and rent extraction.135 
2. Critics’ Arguments that Sunset Provisions Frustrate Long-Term 
Investment 
 Many scholars argue that sunset provisions, and the implicit risk of 
expiration that they represent, frustrate long-term investment due to 
the increased uncertainty and increased costs of rent extraction.136 
Sunset dates introduce a greater chance of legislative change and thus 
create uncertainty in the industry.137 Even though repeal or revision is 
always possible with respect to legislative acts, each at least requires af-
firmative congressional action whereas expiration of a provision upon 
the sunset date does not.138 As Judge Guido Calabresi has noted, “get-
ting a statute enacted is much easier than getting it revised.”139 Fur-
thermore, even if incentives are renewed regularly, the renewals are 
                                                                                                                      
133 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the 
Bush Administration, 2001–2004, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1157, 1178 (2004) (illustrating how per-
manent tax cuts, unlike the expiring tax provisions imposed by the Bush administration, 
threaten fiscal stability); Yin, supra note 20, at 192–93, 199, 208. 
134 See Yin, supra note 20, at 192–93. For example, assuming one year of the PTC cost 
$1 billion, a permanent tax credit would require Congress to report $10 billion in the 
budget, whereas sunsetting the PTC after one year only requires Congress to report $1 
billion in the budget. See id. 
135 See id.; Kysar, supra note 117, at 339–41, 394. A well-organized minority could defeat 
a majority when it comes to renewing provisions. Kysar, supra note 117, at 339–41, 394. 
Some suggest also that Congress promotes sunset provisions due to campaign finance laws 
limiting contributions temporally. See Rebecca Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1007, 1053 (2011) [hereinafter Kysar, Lasting Legislation]; Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. 
Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1159, 
1164–65 (2006). Therefore, rather than a large campaign contribution for one permanent 
law, sunset provisions permit smaller, more frequent contributions. See Kysar, Lasting Legis-
lation, supra, at 1053. 
136 See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23; Kysar, supra note 117, at 368 & nn.223, 225. 
137 See Kysar, supra note 117, at 368. 
138 Id. 
139 Calabresi, supra note 124, at 6. 
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often not seamless and instead leave expiration gaps in the life of the 
tax credit.140 These gaps impose additional costs on taxpayers utilizing 
the credits because they have to resubmit tax forms to reflect expired 
or retroactively renewed tax provisions.141 The long-term benefit of the 
tax cut is diminished due to these increased planning costs.142 
 Given these impediments to long-term investment, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that participants in the renewable energy industry com-
plain of the uncertainty caused by PTC’s frequent sunsetting.143 Ac-
cording to critics, sunset provisions further frustrate the incentivizing 
function of a tax credit because taxpayers will not consider the tax 
credit in their planning due to uncertainty.144 As such, any benefit re-
ceived from the credit is not the motivating factor for the investment 
activity, and the credit becomes a windfall.145 
                                                                                                                     
3. Supporters’ Arguments that Sunset Provisions Promote Investment 
 Other tax scholars maintain that sunset provisions do not discour-
age and may in fact encourage long-term investment, as increased un-
certainty may actually stimulate investment, the argument goes.146 Ini-
tially, if the investment is reversible, greater uncertainty in the future 
existence of a tax benefit will further incentivize investment.147 Reversi-
ble investments are those that “allow an economic actor to change 
 
140 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2010); infra notes 167–179 and accompanying text; 
see also Kysar, supra note 117, at 368–69 (describing the complexities that arise from retro-
active renewals of expired tax provisions). 
141 Kysar, supra note 117, at 368–69. Professor Rebecca Kysar argues that these disad-
vantages of a staggered renewal chain are precisely what constitute the main reasons for 
including sunset provisions. Id. Increases in cost and uncertainty encourage increased 
lobbying, providing opportunity for more rent extraction. Id. at 369. 
142 Id. at 396 (“Uncertainty hurts economic performance by diminishing the incentive 
effects of the tax cut. In addition, uncertainty creates economic waste by increasing plan-
ning, administration, and compliance costs.” (internal citations omitted)). 
143 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8. Other businesses consider sunsetting provi-
sions as a legitimate business risk. See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 135, at 1064 (cit-
ing a General Electric annual report that details the risk of sunset provisions to the busi-
ness). 
144 See Kysar, supra note 117, at 396; Viswanathan, supra note 119, at 669–70. 
145 See Kysar, supra note 117, at 396. 
146 See Yin, supra note 20, at 245 (arguing that short-term investment is certainly served 
by sunset provisions, as fear that the tax incentive will not be renewed will spur investment 
more quickly). 
147 See id.; see also Andrew B. Abel, Optimal Investment Under Uncertainty, 73 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 228, 231–32 (1983) (establishing an economic theory of how uncertainty promotes 
investment). 
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course without significant cost.”148 If the investment is reversible, the 
taxpayer will feel free to invest notwithstanding the fear that the tax 
incentive will expire because in the event that the tax provision sunsets, 
the investment is easily retracted.149 This principle, however, may not 
hold true with irreversible investments, investments that are illiquid, or 
investments that cannot be reversed without significant cost.150 In such 
cases, the taxpayer may refrain from investing until the uncertainty of 
expiration is reduced for fear of investing in less than optimal condi-
tions.151 
 Even with irreversible investments, some economic theorists sug-
gest that uncertainty increases investment.152 These theorists posit that 
when uncertain tax policy exists, taxpayers may speed up or increase 
their investment to evade the possibility of expiration altogether.153 
This theory particularly holds true if the uncertainty concerns an en-
hancement in an existing incentive, as opposed to the existence of the 
incentive itself.154 For instance, bonus depreciation provisions, which 
incentivize development or procurement of certain property, have sun-
set dates.155 If, however, the investor taxpayer acquires property after 
the sunset date without renewal of the provision, the taxpayer still 
benefits from the default depreciation deductions afforded to taxpay-
ers.156 With this knowledge in mind, the taxpayer will be spurred to ac-
quire the property before the sunset provision, resulting in increased 
investment.157 This argument may be classified as the “use it or lose it” 
effect.158 
                                                                                                                     
 Scholars also argue that sunsetting provisions are renewed so fre-
quently that they achieve the same degree of certainty as permanent 
legislation,159 which is also subject to change through revision or re-
 
148 Yin, supra note 20, at 245. 
149 See id. 
150 Id. (“The opposite may be true, however, if an investment is irreversible.”). 
151 Id. at 246. 
152 Id. 
153 Kevin A. Hassett & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Investment with Uncertain Tax Policy: Does Ran-
dom Tax Policy Discourage Investment?, Econ. J., July 1999, at 372, 388. 
154 See id. (“[W]hen tax policy follows a stationary and discrete jump process . . . in-
creasing uncertainty can have the opposite effect, speeding up the time to investment, and 
increasing the amount of capital purchased . . . .”). 
155 26 U.S.C. § 168(k) (2006). 
156 See Yin, supra note 20, at 246 & n.266 (arguing that greater uncertainty can spur in-
vestment, particularly when the provision will revert to the mean, like bonus depreciation 
provisions). 
157 Id. at 246. 
158 Id. 
159 See id. at 246–47. 
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peal.160 Finally, permanent legislation may actually create a “certainty 
illusion,” whereby taxpayers are not mindful of the frequent changes to 
legislation: 
Conversely, if one effect of greater use of temporary-effect 
laws is to improve the perceived fiscal sustainability of all laws, 
then the decrease in uncertainty should enhance the effec-
tiveness of all economic incentives. Temporary-effect laws may 
also be viewed in a positive light because they create realistic 
benchmarks for the reexamination of policy direction.161 
Government action, therefore, should not be taken as certain, as it is 
always subject to change.162 Sunsets remind those who benefit from tax 
incentives of this truth.163 
B. Sunsetting the Production Tax Credit 
 Despite disagreement among scholars regarding the value of sun-
set dates generally, those in the renewable energy industry agree that 
sunsetting of the PTC has impacted the industry and that a permanent 
PTC would result in more long-term investment in renewable energy.164 
Despite the success of the PTC, the credit has not become a permanent 
feature of the Internal Revenue Code and has been subject to the cur-
rent sunset trend in Congress.165 When the PTC was originally adopted 
in 1992, the taxpayer could only receive the credit if the qualifying facil-
ity was placed in service after December 31, 1993 and before July 1, 
1999.166 The latter date was the sunset date, at which point Congress 
would decide whether to renew the PTC.167 Taxpayers that placed a 
facility in service prior to the sunset date would enjoy the full ten-year 
credit period.168 
 As such, Congress initially gave investors a six-and-a-half-year win-
dow to begin to develop and construct projects to claim the credit be-
                                                                                                                      
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 248. 
162 See Yin, supra note 20, at 248. 
163 See id. 
164 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8. 
165 See infra notes 166–180 and accompanying text. 
166 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1914, 106 Stat. 2776, 3020 (codi-
fied as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 38–39, 45 (West 2010)). 
167 Id. 
168 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(a), (d). 
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fore the PTC expired on July 1, 1999.169 Five months after the credit 
expired, Congress extended it for two more years; the credit then ex-
pired for a second time on January 1, 2002.170 Two months later, in 
March 2002, Congress renewed the PTC for qualifying facilities placed 
in service before 2004.171 Again, in January 2004, the PTC expired for a 
third time, and Congress renewed it in October 2004 until the end of 
2005.172 At this point, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 renewed the PTC 
for facilities placed in service before 2008.173 Congress then extended it 
for an additional year in December of 2008.174 Finally, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act extended the PTC once again un-
til the end of 2012 for wind energy.175 
 Therefore, beyond the initial six-and-a-half-year period, the PTC 
has been extended only for one to three years at a time and only with 
frequent expirations.176 It was effective for two years, and then two 
more years, and then one year, and then two years again, and then 
three years.177 On three separate occasions, in 1999, 2001, and 2003, 
Congress let the PTC expire.178 Political disagreements have contrib-
                                                                                                                      
169 Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1914. The Committee on Ways and Means justified the 
initial six and a half year window to provide an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of 
the credit and to evaluate its need with respect to energy prices. H.R. Rep. No. 102-474, pt. 
6, at 3364 (1992). Some have lauded this experimental value of sunset provisions. See Ger-
sen, supra note 113, at 275. 
170 Tax Relief Extension Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 507, 113 Stat. 1860, 1922 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45). 
171 Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 603, 116 
Stat. 21, 59 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45). 
172 Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 313, 118 Stat. 1166, 
1181 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45). 
173 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1301, 119 Stat. 594, 986–87 (codi-
fied as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45). 
174 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 201, 120 Stat. 2922, 
2944 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45). 
175 American Relief and Reinvestment Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1101, 123 Stat. 115, 
319 (2009) (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45). 
176 See supra notes 166–175 and accompanying text. 
177 Section 1101, 123 Stat. at 319 (renewing the PTC for three years); § 201, 120 Stat. at 
2944 (renewing the PTC for one year); § 313, 118 Stat. at 1181 (renewing the PTC for one 
year); § 1301, 119 Stat. at 986–87 (renewing the PTC for two years); Job Creation and 
Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 603, 116 Stat. 21, 59 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45) (renewing the PTC for less than two years); Tax Relief Ex-
tension Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 507, 113 Stat. 1860, 1922 (codified as amended 
at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45) (renewing the PTC for two years); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-486, § 1914, 106 Stat. 2776, 3020 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 38–39, 45 
(West 2010)) (establishing the PTC initially for six and a half years). 
178 See supra notes 170–177 and accompanying text. 
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uted to this staggered expiration and extension schedule.179 Clearly, 
even though the PTC has been consistently renewed since 2005, uncer-
tainty over its continuation still exists because each renewal in Congress 
has introduced political posturing and debate.180 
 The American Wind Energy Association states that the “on-again, 
off-again” production tax credit causes uncertainty, which discourages 
long-term investment in wind power manufacturing and develop-
ment.181 This impact is evidenced in Table 1, below. 
 
Table I: Installed Capacity of Wind Energy (MW) from 1992 to 2010 182 
Year Net Installed Wind Capacity in Megawatts 
Percent change from 
previous year Status of PTC 
1999 659.00 — Expired on 7/1/1999 
2000 66.845 -899% Renewed and set to expire 1/1/2002 
2001 1692.45 2432% Set to expire 1/1/2002 
2002 455.588 -73% Expired and then renewed on 3/1/2002 until 2004 
2003 1662.581 265% Set to expire 1/1/2004 
2004 373.182 -78% Expired 1/1/2004, renewed 10/2004 
2005 2423.94 550% Set to expire 1/1/2006 
2006 2427.441 0.14% Set to expire 1/1/2007 
2007 5332.545 120% Set to expire 1/1/2008 
2008 8502.992 59% Set to expire 1/1/2009 
2009 9453.311 11% Set to expire 1/1/2013 
 
 Notably, Table 1 demonstrates that newly installed wind capacity 
dropped precipitously in the years in which the PTC expired.183 This 
drop is particularly evident in 2002 and 2004, where the newly installed 
capacity dropped by over 1200 megawatts each year.184 This trend sug-
gests that the PTC is essential to the wind industry.185 Conversely, con-
                                                                                                                      
179 See Riti, supra note 6, at 791. 
180 See generally id. (detailing the political squabbling that took place with the PTC re-
newal, particularly post-2000). 
181 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8; Wiser et al., supra note 14, at 5. 
182 See Wind Capacity and Projects, supra note 80; supra notes 170–180 and accompanying 
text. 
183 See Wind Capacity and Projects, supra note 80; supra notes 170–180 and accompanying 
text. 
184 See Wind Capacity and Projects, supra note 80; supra notes 170–180 and accompanying 
text. 
185 Wind Capacity and Projects, supra note 80; see Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8 (in-
dustry experts at the American Wind Energy Association demonstrate that the dips in 
added wind capacity can be attributed totally to the PTC expiration). 
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tinuity in the availability of the PTC promoted steady growth from 2005 
to 2009, albeit at an inconsistent growth rate.186 Furthermore, one 
study indicates that expiration could result in $19 billion of lost invest-
ment and 116,000 lost jobs.187 If the PTC expired in 2009, this study 
projected that only 500 megawatts of wind energy would have been 
produced, compared with 6500 megawatts with the PTC in place; an-
other study projected that the lack of the PTC would result in fifty per-
cent less added wind capacity by 2025.188 
 Even though the PTC has spurred investment in renewable energy, 
it appears that the credit has been unable to reach its full potential.189 
It is possible that the drops in added capacity represent mere timing 
shifts, such that no change in added capacity results.190 Nonetheless, 
staggered renewals have caused investors to rush to complete projects 
before the PTC expiration, leading to a “boom-and-bust” investment 
cycle, particularly since 1999, whereby the PTC was renewed only on a 
1–3 year basis and was repeatedly allowed to expire.191 As a result of 
this, wind production has occurred in “tight and frenzied windows of 
development,” leading to a number of negative outcomes for the U.S. 
wind industry.192 
 Industry experts suggest that this “boom-and-bust” cycle leads to 
decreased renewable energy development.193 First, it increases the cost 
of renewable projects.194 A “herd effect” results when all developers 
strive to finish renewable projects at the same time: the resulting con-
current added demand increases the cost of materials and construction 
services.195 Second, this increased cost in manufactured components 
may result in greater reliance on foreign manufacturing and may de-
crease foreign investment in U.S. manufacturing facilities of renewable 
                                                                                                                      
186 See Wind Capacity and Projects, supra note 80. 
187 Economic Impacts, supra note 26, at 22. 
188 Id. (indicating that only 500 MW of wind energy would be produced without the 
PTC, compared with 6500 MW with its extension); EIA Report, supra note 26, at 4 (indi-
cating a 50% more wind capacity by 2025 with PTC extension). Lack of PTC extension 
beyond 2008 would have cost the U.S. economy $11.5 billion of decreased economic activ-
ity. Economic Impacts, supra note 26, at 22. 
189 See Wiser et al., supra note 14, at 5 (detailing the secondary impacts of the incon-
sistency of PTC availability on the wind energy industry in the United States). 
190 See Hassett & Metcalf, supra note 153, at 388; Wind Capacity and Projects, supra note 80. 
191 Wiser et al., supra note 14, at 5. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. (noting that the “boom-and-bust” cycle increases the cost of wind energy pro-
jects). 
195See Riti, supra note 6, at 795. 
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components.196 Third, the rush to complete a project may lead to 
smaller projects because to meet the “placed in service” date and be 
eligible for the credit, developers settle for smaller projects that can be 
finished on time.197 Currently, development has been slowing because 
lenders will not loan money if the project is not comfortably scheduled 
to be in service within the year the PTC sunsets.198 
 Furthermore, the renewable projects suffer from the enhanced 
risk of sunsetting tax credits during the riskiest phase of the project.199 
Typically the first financial phase of a project is the development and 
permitting phase, which requires equity funding.200 Second, the con-
struction phase occurs upon full permitting and relies on both debt 
and equity.201 Lastly, the least risky phase is operation which requires 
only a construction loan refinanced with long-term, low rates.202 The 
first financial stage requires commitments of high risk equity, including 
tax equity investors; uncertainty over whether the PTC will be available 
makes investors unwilling to commit to the project.203 As a result, it is 
unlikely that projects would receive sufficient financing at the construc-
tion or operating stages.204 
C. The Sun Rises on the Low-Income Housing Credit 
 This Section discusses the LIHTC, a tax credit to promote invest-
ment in low-income housing that is a useful tool for comparison to the 
PTC because: (1) unlike the PTC, it has become a permanent feature 
of the tax code and escaped the recent sunset trend in Congress, and 
                                                                                                                      
196 Wiser et al., supra note 14, at 5. Increased reliance on foreign manufacturing prompt-
ed senators to introduce “Make It in America” or “Buy American” legislation, which would re-
quire stimulus spending to be used on domestic construction materials. John M. Broder, Sena-
tors Want ‘Buy American’ Rule in Stimulus, N.Y. Times Green (Mar. 3, 2010, 3:27 PM), 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/03/senators-want-buy-american-rule-in-stimulus/. 
197 Aaron Severn et al., Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Wind Energy Production Tax 
Credit (PTC) 4 (2008). 
198 Telephone Interview with James Duffy, Partner, Nixon Peabody LLP (Mar. 1, 2011). 
199 See E-mail from Dennis Duffy, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Energy Mgmt. 
Inc., to author (Mar. 26, 2011, 2:34 EST) (on file with author); Mark Weitzel & Les Sherman, 
Partners, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Presentation: Financing Renewable Energy 
Projects 11 (May 2009) [hereinafter Financing Projects], available at http://reaction. orrick. 
com/reaction/event_pdfs/OrrickCleantechEvent050609_ProjectFinancingHandout.pdf. 
200 See Financing Projects, supra note 199, at 12. 
201 See E-mail from Dennis Duffy to author, supra note 199; Financing Projects, supra 
note 199, at 12. 
202 See Financing Projects, supra note 199, at 12; E-mail from Dennis Duffy to author, 
supra note 199. 
203 See E-mail from Dennis Duffy to author, supra note 199. 
204 See id. 
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(2) it incentives private investment in low-income housing, a socially 
beneficial but relatively unprofitable industry, like renewable energy.205 
Congress created the LIHTC in 1986, and it has since become the pri-
mary federal program to incentivize the production of affordable hous-
ing.206 Like the PTC and renewable energy, the program has resulted in 
private investment in poor communities and promoted a public-private 
partnership in the development of low-income housing.207 The LIHTC 
amounts to a certain percentage of the “qualified basis of each quali-
fied low-income building.”208 
 The LIHTC was subject to a few sunset provisions during the nas-
cent stages of the program, but it eventually became permanent.209 
Originally, it was slated to expire in 1989.210 Subsequently, Congress 
extended the LIHTC program for a year at a time in 1989, 1990, and 
1991.211 Finally, in 1993, the tax provision became a permanent part of 
the tax code through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.212 One 
expert in the program writes the following of the period prior to per-
manent codification of the LIHTC: 
                                                                                                                      
205 26 U.S.C.A. § 42 (West 2010); see supra notes 39–69 (establishing the benefits and 
barriers to renewable energy); supra notes 169–180 and accompanying text (indicating the 
sunsetting trend with respect to the PTC); infra notes 209–212 and accompanying text 
(indicating the permanency of the LIHTC). The LIHTC was created in a time when a 
great deal of emphasis was placed on the private market as a mechanism to incentivize 
certain behavior. See Janet Stearns, The Low Income Housing Tax Credit: A Poor Solution to the 
Housing Crisis, 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 203, 205–06 (1988). 
206 Janet Thompson Jackson, Can Free Enterprise Cure Urban Ills?: Lost Opportunities for 
Business Development in Urban, Low-Income Communities Through the New Markets Tax Credit 
Program, 37 U. Mem. L. Rev. 659, 659, 683 (2007). 
207 See id. at 684–85; see also Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8 (indicating that the PTC 
has resulted in private investment in the renewable industry). Also like the PTC, there 
have been some criticisms of the LIHTC program. Id. Some scholars report that most 
housing is developed in metropolitan areas with a high levels of poverty, yet the housing is 
only available to low-income households with a relatively high income. Id. Also, critics sug-
gest that the financing costs of these developments discourage the production of housing 
for very low-income households. Id. 
208 26 U.S.C.A. § 42(a). 
209 David Philip Cohen, Improving the Supply of Affordable Housing: The Role of the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit, 6 J.L. & Pol’y 537, 537 (1998); see infra notes 210–212 and ac-
companying text. 
210 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2189–90 (co-
dified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 42). 
211 Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, § 107, 105 Stat. 1686, 1687 (codi-
fied as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 42); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-508, § 11407, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388–474 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 42); 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7108, 103 Stat. 2106, 
2307 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 42). 
212 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13142, 107 Stat. 
312, 437–38 (1993) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 42). 
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Up to this point, the LIHTC program was making halting pro-
gress, given that the development community could not be 
sure of its future existence. With the 1993 Act, Congress fi-
nally made the program permanent. As a result, developers 
could begin to prepare proposals with the knowledge that the 
program would survive from year to year.213 
In fact, the House Committee on Ways and Means corroborated this 
rationale for a permanent extension, requiring the permanency of the 
tax credit in the interest of certainty for investment and efficiency.214 
III. Sunsetting the PTC Frustrates the Policy Goal of  
Long-Term Investment 
 The PTC’s sunset provisions frustrate the congressional policy of 
promoting long-term investment in renewable energy.215 This Part first 
establishes that the theoretical argument favoring sunset dates as a 
means to promote long-term investment does not apply to the PTC and 
the renewable energy industry.216 Next, this Part utilizes the LIHTC to 
illustrate how permanent tax credits enhance long-term investment 
and efficiency.217 Other than its permanency, the LIHTC has many fea-
tures analogous to the PTC: the structure of the credit, the syndication 
requirements, and the incentivized industry.218 Therefore, it serves as 
an appropriate lens to analyze what impact the PTC’s incessant sunset-
ting has on long-term investment.219 
A. Sunset Dates Do Not Promote Long-Term Investment in the  
Renewable Energy Industry 
 The example of the PTC contradicts any contention by tax schol-
ars that sunset dates promote long-term investment in the renewable 
energy industry.220 First, renewable energy projects are irreversible in-
                                                                                                                      
213 McClure, supra note 23, at 96. 
214 H.R. Rep. No. 102-631, pt. A, at 20 (1992) (“Further, the committee believes that a 
permanent extension of the low-income housing credit will provide the greater planning 
certainty needed for the efficient delivery of this Federal subsidy without sacrificing Con-
gress’ ability to exercise appropriate oversight of the administration of, and need for, pro-
grams such as the tax credit.”). 
215 See Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23. 
216 See infra notes 220–256 and accompanying text. 
217 See infra notes 258–292 and accompanying text. 
218 See infra notes 258–292 and accompanying text. 
219 See infra notes 258–292 and accompanying text. 
220 See infra notes 221–256 and accompanying text. 
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vestments with long lead times, and therefore investors cannot easily 
retract their investments upon expiration of the PTC.221 Second, the 
sunset dates deal with complete abrogation of the credit, not mere less-
ening of the incentive.222 Finally, the PTC does not have an “illusion of 
certainty.”223 
 The argument that uncertainty in tax incentives promotes invest-
ment in reversible investments does not apply to renewable energy pro-
jects, which are not reversible investments.224 Renewable energy invest-
ment often requires specialized syndication agreements to monetize the 
PTC and large amounts of debt and equity.225 Furthermore, electricity 
generation is a specialized industry, rendering the equipment, property, 
and investments relatively illiquid.226 Also, the length of time required 
to develop renewable projects, particularly wind, makes such invest-
ments irreversible.227 Therefore, the argument that sunset dates are 
beneficial for reversible investments simply does not apply to the 
TC
-
etit
                                                                                                                     
P .228 
 The “use it or lose it” phenomenon, whereby investment increases 
as taxpayers seek to utilize the credit prior to expiration, also does not 
apply to renewable energy projects, nor to their respective tax cred-
its.229 Again, the assumption underlying this phenomenon is that expi-
ration would merely revert to a less beneficial, yet still existent, tax in-
centive.230 With the PTC, expiration due to sunset provisions results in 
the abrogation of the credit altogether; indeed, the PTC has expired on 
three separate occasions.231 Such uncertainty about the actual existence 
of the PTC (which is required to make renewable projects cost com
p ive) chills private investment in the renewable energy industry.232 
 
221 See Yin, supra note 20, at 245; supra notes 52–69 (indicating barriers to renewable 
development); supra notes 98–111 and accompanying text (indicating monetization chal-
lenges). 
222 See Yin, supra note 20, at 245–46. 
223 See id. at 248. 
224 See id. at 245. 
225 See supra notes 98–111 and accompanying text (describing the monetization proc-
ess for renewable energy credits). 
226 Margot Freeman Saunders & Nancy Brockway, Access to Utility Service 27 
(1996). 
227 See E-mail from Dennis Duffy to author, supra note 58 (indicating the long length of 
renewable projects); Leest, supra note 59. 
228 See Yin, supra note 20, at 245. 
229 See id. at 246. 
230 See id. at 245–46. 
231 See supra notes 166–179 and accompanying text. 
232 See Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23–24; supra notes 166–179 and accompanying text. 
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 The “use it or lose it” argument further does not apply because 
renewable energy projects typically take longer to plan and facilitate 
than the actual renewal period.233 The behavior incentivized is not 
merely acquiring certain property or investing money (investment ac-
tivities that can be done in a short period of time); rather, the PTC aims 
to incentivize placing a renewable energy project in service, an activity 
that entails investment, permitting, long-term contracts with utilities, 
construction, grid access, and NEPA review, all of which take three to 
seven years rather than the one to four years offered by the renewal 
period.234 Furthermore, for the PTC, the electricity must be sold to a 
third party, which introduces more challenges.235 Investors may en-
deavor to place a wind farm in service during the proper year to benefit 
from a tax credit, but there are a number of factors that may slow this 
process and prevent the ability of the investor to “use it.”236 Therefore, 
e 
ring renewals.240 Any 
                       
th unpredictability and length of renewable energy project timelines 
may prevent the taxpayer from “using” the credit before it sunsets.237 
 The argument that sunsetted tax credits are essentially permanent 
does not apply to the PTC,238 which has in fact expired on three differ-
ent occasions.239 Those in the industry continually doubt the PTC’s re-
newal by Congress, due to political posturing du
                                                                                               
 (West 2010); supra notes 52–69 and accompanying text (de-
scrib wable energy development); supra notes 167–179 and accompa-
nyin
e it” theory's applicability to the PTC, the fre-
que
153
 (establishing the unpredictability of the 
leng t 388; Leest, supra note 59. 
. 
 difficulties of PTC renewal). 
233 See E-mail from Dennis Duffy to author, supra note 58 (indicating the long length of 
renewable projects); Leest, supra note 59; supra notes 167–179 and accompanying text 
(describing the frequent two- to four-year renewal periods for the PTC). 
234 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)
ing obstacles to rene
g text (describing the frequent two- to four-year renewal periods for the PTC); see also 
Yin, supra note 20, at 245–46. 
235 26 U.S.C.A. § 45. 
236 See supra notes 52–69 and accompanying text (discussing obstructions to renewable 
development, including enhanced risk, siting difficulties, grid access, and high costs). Ar-
guably, notwithstanding the “use it or los
nt expiration and renewal of tax incentives do not increase usage of the credit but 
instead shift the timing of the usage to prior to expiration. See Hassel & Metcalf, supra note 
, at 388; Yin, supra note 20, at 245–46. 
237 See supra notes 52–69 and accompanying text
th of projects); see also Hassel & Metcalf, supra note 153, a
238 See Yin, supra note 20, at 248 (arguing that some sunsetted tax credits are renewed 
so frequently that they are essentially permanent). 
239 See id.; supra notes 167–179 and accompanying text
240 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8 (illustrating industry doubt regarding PTC re-
newal); Riti, supra note 6, at 788 (describing political posturing that occurred during PTC 
renewals and indicating the
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spurring of growth that does occur may actually hurt the renewable 
industry as a whole due to its irregular nature.241 
 The “illusion of certainty” argument is also misguided.242 Although 
all investments that result from tax credits suffer from some degree of 
repeal risks, it is more likely that Congress will fail to renew a provision 
than take affirmative action to change or repeal a provision, as has 
been established by Calabresi.243 Scholars refer to this tendency towards 
inaction as “legislative inertia.”244 After all, repeal and amendment re-
quire passage in both houses and presidential signature, whereas expi-
ration requires no action at all.245 As such, it is riskier for investors to 
rely on a tax provision with a sunset date than a permanent tax provi-
sion, even though the permanent provision is subject to repeal or revi-
on
the extent that it does spur invest-
en
PTC to promote steadier growth.251 The American Wind Energy Asso-
     
si .246 Again, such lapse in availability is precisely what occurred with 
the PTC.247 
 In sum, none of the arguments suggesting that sunset provisions 
actually promote long-term investment apply to the PTC and renewable 
energy industry.248 Instead, the frequent sunset provisions of the PTC 
discourage long-term investment because those in the industry cannot 
rely on its continued existence; to 
m t, the resultant “boom-and-bust” cycle harms the industry by raising 
manufacturing and capital costs.249 
 These concerns over long-term investment are felt by those in the 
renewable energy industry.250 Many recommend a more permanent 
                                                                                                                 
241 Wiser et al., supra note 14, at 5; supra notes 193–198 and accompanying text (es-
tabl t raises the costs of renewable industry and harms 
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, at 6. 
ministrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delega-
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 and accompanying text. 
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244 Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Ad
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245 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7. 
246 See Calabresi, supra note 124, at 6. 
247 See supra notes 166–179 and accompanying text (detailing the expiration and re-
newal timeline of the PTC). 
248 See Yin, supra note 20, at 248; supra notes 224–247
249 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8 (communicating the need for a more perma-
nent PTC); Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23 (arguing that temporary legislation harms the 
renewable industry and increases capital and manufacturing costs). 
250 See infra notes 251–256 and accompanying text. 
251 See, e.g., First in Series on Effect of Federal Tax Laws on the Production, Supply, and Conser-
vation of Energy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Meas
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ciation recommends that the credit be extended for at least five more 
years.252 The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Fi-
nance Committee both mirrored this recommendation in the 110th 
Congress.253 Those in the industry have consistently testified to Con-
gress regarding the importance of a predictable tax incentive policy to 
the industry.254 Dean Gosselin, of Business Development for Wind 
Pow
acilities that will drive economies of 
uous renewal, may discourage 
investment in the renewable industry.256 
t, unlike the 
PTC, has become a permanent feature of the tax code.257 
                                                                                                                     
er, stated: 
Unfortunately in this instance, two plus one plus one plus one 
does not necessarily equal five predictable years. . . . Business 
thrives on the known and fails on the unknown. The unpre-
dictable nature of the credit has prevented the needed in-
vestment in U.S.-based f
scale and efficiencies.255 
As such, the uncertainty, despite contin
B. Success of the Permanent LIHTC as a Lesson for the PTC 
 The LIHTC is a valuable tool to assess the impact of sunset provi-
sions on the effectiveness of the PTC because it similarly incentivizes 
private investment in the low-income housing industry, bu
 
and Means, 107th Cong. 78, 96 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Hearing] (statement of Robert 
Morrison, Vice President, FPL Energy) (recommending a five- to seven-year extension of 
the  growth in the wind energy industry); Wind 
Age
 
253
254
n cy-
 are at least 12–18 months long. The immediate extension of the 
lect 
Reve ent of 
Dea
; supra notes 169–180 and accompanying text (indicating the 
 
PTC in order to promote more steady
nda, supra note 5, at 8 (suggesting a more permanent PTC). 
252 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8.
 See 2001 Hearing, supra note 251, at 78, 96; Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8. 
 2001 Hearing, supra note 251, at 78. 
Since the PTC is directly linked to energy production, the credit is inextrica-
bly tied to the financing, permitting and construction of new facilities. With 
the credit due to expire in only a few months, it is very difficult to adequately 
plan for anything but the most immediate projects. Longer-term plans are 
simply prevented by the budgeting, permitting and project constructio
cles, all of which
PTC is critical to the continued development of wind power in the United States. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
255 Tax Credits for Electricity Production from Renewable Sources Before the Subcomm. on Se
nue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 24–25 (2005) (statem
n Gosselin, Vice President of Business Development for Wind Power, FPL Energy). 
256 See id.; Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8; Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23–24. 
257 26 U.S.C.A. § 42 (West 2010); see supra notes 39–69 (establishing the benefits and 
barriers to renewable energy)
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1. Similarities Between the PTC and the LIHTC 
 Like renewable energy, low-income housing is an important social 
concern, particularly since the recession, as the gap has widened be-
tween the number of renting households and the availability of afford-
able units to rent.258 Currently, twelve million households spend over 
fifty percent of household income on housing.259 A family with only 
one full-time, minimum wage earner cannot afford a fair-market, two-
bedroom rental anywhere in the United States.260 The production of 
low-income housing is therefore necessary, much like the production of 
renewable energy.261 
 Furthermore, affordable housing development, like renewable 
energy production, faces barriers to market entry.262 Renting or selling 
housing units for below market rates would be a less profitable, perhaps 
even unprofitable, venture for developers and investors.263 Further-
more, there tend to be many objections to siting affordable housing 
developments.264 
 The PTC and LIHTC share many structural similarities: both re-
quire that the project comply with certain guidelines during the life of 
the tax credit, and both are based on production, not just initiation.265 
For the PTC, the electricity must be produced and sold, and for the 
LIHTC the units must be consistently occupied by low-income ten-
ants.266 As such, the investment is necessarily long term and irreversible 
for both the LIHTC and the PTC.267 
                                                                                                                      
sunsetting trend of the PTC); supra notes 210–212 and accompanying text (indicating the 
permanency of the LIHTC). 
258 Melissa Kresin & Mary Schwartz, Rental Housing Market Condition: 2009, Am. Cmty. 
Survey Briefs (U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2010, at 1, available at http:// 
www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acsbr09-7.pdf. 
259 Affordable Housing, HUD.gov, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/ 
(last visited May 17, 2011). 
260 See id. 
261 See id.; supra notes 39–51 and accompanying text (listing the social and environ-
mental benefits of renewable energy). 
262 Affordable Housing, supra note 259 (describing affordable housing as below-market 
housing). 
263 See id.; supra notes 52–69 and accompanying text. 
264 See Daniel R. Mandelker et al., Planning and Control of Land Development: 
Cases and Materials 446–47 (7th ed. 2008). The “not in my backyard” philosophy cre-
ates much local resistance to affordable housing projects. Id. 
265 See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 42(a), § 45(a) (West 2010); McClure, supra note 23, at 104 (not-
ing that tax credits are not provided if a project does not comply with LIHTC guidelines). 
266 See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 42(c), 45(a). 
267 See id. 
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 Additionally, like the renewable energy tax credits, the LIHTC re-
quires that developers monetize the tax credits by entering financing 
agreements with tax equity investors.268 If real estate developers do not 
expect to have such income tax liability and require capital investment, 
tion 
of renewable energy projects, and leaders in the industry opine that 
ogram.272 
mmodate the long-term invest-
men use 
Com
                                                                                                                     
then tax equity investors will infuse the projects with capital and cap-
ture the tax credits during the ten-year period.269 
 Finally, both programs have been successful.270 Due to the LIHTC, 
millions of affordable units have been built and restored over the past 
twenty-five years.271 The PTC has similarly led to increased produc
most such projects would not be built without the PTC pr
2. Promoting Permanency for Long-Term Investment 
 The LIHTC’s success after becoming permanent supports the 
conclusion that permanent extension of tax credits can promote long-
term investment in certain industries.273 Both the LIHTC and the PTC, 
over the course of their legislative histories, have been subject to sunset 
provisions; unlike the PTC, which Congress continues to sunset, how-
ever, LIHTC was made permanent in 1993.274 Those in the real estate 
development industry communicated the same need that those in the 
wind industry are communicating: certainty that the tax credit will exist 
is needed for long-term planning and investment.275 Real estate devel-
opers began to make long-term plans more frequently once the LIHTC 
became permanent and certain.276 In fact, the very rationale for mak-
ing the LIHTC permanent was to acco
t interests of real estate developers.277 A report from the Ho
mittee on Ways and Means stated: 
 
268 See McClure, supra note 23, at 104. 
269 See id. 
270 John A. Powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act at 40, 
18 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 145, 154 (2009); see Wind Agenda, supra note 5, 
at 8. 
271 Powell, supra note 270, at 154. Some concern exists, however, over the disparate 
production of low-income housing in segregated areas. Id. 
272 See EIA Report, supra note 26, at 4; Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8. 
273 See infra notes 274–292 and accompanying text. 
274 See supra notes 167–179 and accompanying text (detailing the renewal and expira-
tion history of the PTC); supra notes 210–212 and accompanying text (detailing the re-
newal and expiration history of the LIHTC). 
275 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8; McClure, supra note 23, at 96. 
276 McClure, supra note 23, at 96. 
277 H.R. Rep. No. 102-631, pt. A, at 20 (1992). 
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[T]he committee believes that a permanent extension of the 
low-income housing credit will provide the greater planning 
certainty needed for the efficient delivery of this Federal sub-
sidy without sacrificing Congress’s ability to exercise appro-
mmittee addressed the need for better “planning certainty” to 
rom
-organized retail funds.281 The permanency of the credit, 
owever, attracted larger investors to the low-income housing mar-
 
Table 2: Pro laced in Service Using from 198
priate oversight of the administration of, and need for, pro-
grams such as the tax credit.278 
The co
p ote the efficiency of the credit to incentivize low-income hous-
ing.279 
 Furthermore, corporate investors in low-income housing were rare 
before 1993, but when the program became permanent, more large-
scale corporate investors began to utilize the credits.280 Prior to 1992, 
most low-income projects raised equity through individual investors by 
way of broker
h
ket.282 
jects P the LIHTC 7 to 1999 283 
Year Pla Service Number of Units ced in Status of LIHTC 
1987 17,514 Slated to expire in 1989 
1988 35,742 Slated to expire in 1989 
1989 48,269 Extended for one year 
1990 49,088 Ex ar tended for one ye
1991 49,537 Exten  year ded for one
1992 52,299 Slated to expire in 1993 
1993 63,512 Made t permanen
1994 63,714 Permanent 
1995 81,319 Permanent 
1996 83,775 Permanent 
1997 88,449 Permanent 
1998 94,760 Permanent 
1999 112,092 Permanent 
 
                                                                                                                      
278 Id. 
279 See id. 
280 Jean L. Cummings & Denise DiPasquale, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: An 
Analysis of the First Ten Years, 10 Housing Pol’y Debate, no. 2, 1999, at 251, 291; Tele-
phone Interview with James Duffy, supra note 198. 
281 See Cummings & DiPasquale, supra note 280, at 291. 
282 See id. 
283 Office of Econ. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Updating the 
Low-Income Housing Credit (LIHTC) Database: Projects Placed in Service Through 
2006, at 176 (2009), available at http://www.huduser.org/Datasets/lihtc/report 9506.pdf; 
supra notes 210–212 and accompanying text. 
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 During the six-year period in which Congress renewed the LIHTC 
for one to three years at a time, the credit was less successful.284 Since 
 “boom-and-bust” investment cycle that re-
gy industry strongly advocate for a more perma-
nent tax credit for planning purposes, like those in the low-income 
housin
                                                                           
being made permanent, the total allocation has steadily increased with-
out drastic spikes and drops.285 
 Similarly, the PTC has experienced only halted and inconsistent 
progress due to its frequent sunset provisions.286 Therefore, the PTC, 
unlike the LIHTC, has not had the opportunity to reach its full poten-
tial as a result of frequent sunset dates.287 Production dropped during 
the expirations and the rate of growth has been inconsistent in the past 
six years.288 To the extent that the PTC has increased renewable capac-
ity in the United States, the
sults from rushing projects prior to sunset dates actually harms the re-
newable energy industry.289 
 Congress should therefore apply the same certainty and efficiency 
rationale to permanently extend the PTC in order to promote long-
term investment.290 The wind industry and development of renewable 
energy suffer from the uncertainty of the renewable tax credits due to 
the frequent expirations and need for renewals.291 Furthermore, those 
in the renewable ener
g industry.292 
IV. The Sunsetting of Renewable Energy Tax Credits 
Undermines the Goals of the Tax System 
 The sunsetting feature of the PTC contravenes the underlying 
principles of the U.S. tax system.293 The extensive use of sunsetting in 
                                           
3, at 176; supra notes 210–212 and ac-
com
cts, supra note 80. 
ard, supra note 17, at 23–24; Wind Ca-
paci
 al., supra note 14, at 12; Riti, supra note 6, at 795. 
nying text (establishing the uncertainty of the 
PTC dustry). 
 and accompanying text. 
284 See Office of Econ. Affairs, supra note 283, at 176; supra notes 210–212 and ac-
companying text; supra Table 2. 
285 See Office of Econ. Affairs, supra note 28
panying text; supra Table 2. 
286 See Wind Capacity and Proje
287 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8; Kleinb
ty and Projects, supra note 80. 
288 See Wind Capacity and Projects, supra note 80. 
289 See Wiser et
290 EIA Report, supra note 26, at 4; Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8; Wiser et al., su-
pra note 14, at 12. 
291 See supra notes 181–204 and accompa
 and its resultant impact on the renewable energy in
292 See Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8. 
293 See infra notes 294–350
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the tax code and with respect to the PTC warrants a policy analysis.294 
This Part analyzes the frequent sunsetting of the PTC as a feature of the 
tax system within the framework of the three goals of a tax system: sim-
plicity, equity, and economic efficiency.295 Because budgetary manipu-
lation and special interest involvement is the primary motivating factor 
 su
tion will be fair, simple to admin-
ter
qually situated taxpayers paying 
                                                                                                                     
of nset provisions, the inefficiencies and complexities that these pro-
visions create are not offset by any countervailing tax policy.296 
 Analyses of tax proposals and policy, including renewable energy 
incentives, traditionally consider the following criteria: equity, simplic-
ity, and efficiency.297 Ideally, tax collec
is , and easy to understand.298 Finally, tax collection should limit un-
intended distortions of the economy.299 
 Creating a simple, easily understood tax system has been a public 
policy objective of legislators and courts for years.300 Simplicity is typi-
cally evaluated based on the ease of taxpayer understanding and the 
costs of compliance.301 Nonetheless, some scholars maintain that com-
plexity is a necessary trade-off for achieving equity.302 The equity analy-
sis of tax collection falls into two categories, horizontal equity and verti-
cal equity.303 The former concerns e
 
 and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Cred-
its, 
et the renewable 
ener PTC. See id. 
3. 
State of 
Fed
eates higher compliance costs and that, consequently, only sophisticated taxpayers 
can
Simplification, 22 Va. Tax 
Rev  trade-off for achiev-
ing 
294 Kysar, supra note 117, at 338 (enumerating all of the broad public laws that have 
been extensively sunsetted). 
295 Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency
59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 42 (2006) (enumerating the principles of a tax system); see infra 
notes 310–350 and accompanying text. 
296 See Riti, supra note 6, at 798. In 2007, for instance, the need to offs
gy credits by repealing other subsidies thwarted the renewal of the 
297 Andrews, supra note 18, at 8–10; McDaniel, supra note 4, at 2–
298 Andrews, supra note 18, at 10; McDaniel, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
299 Andrews, supra note 18, at 9; McDaniel, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
300 See, e.g., Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 522 (1923) (“Logic and taxation 
are not always the best of friends.”) (McReynolds, J., concurring). The 2001 Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation presented a study in 2001 regarding the simplification of the tax code. See 
generally Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 107th Cong., Study of Overall 
eral Tax System and Recommendations for Simplification, Pursuant to Sec-
tion 8022(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Comm. Print 2001). 
301 Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen’s Guide to the Great 
Debate over Tax Reform 163–64 (4th ed. 2008) (establishing that the complexity of the tax 
code cr
 benefit from the advantages (loopholes and the like) that the layers of sophistication 
offer). 
302 See, e.g., Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax 
. 645, 650–53 (2003) (establishing that complexity is an inevitable
equity and efficiency, whereas complexity causes little harm). 
303 Andrews, supra note 18, at 9; McDaniel, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
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equal amounts of tax.304 The latter concerns appropriate differences 
among taxpayers who are different.305 
 Finally, economic efficiency measures the extent to which a tax 
interferes with economic behavior.306 Taxes reduce economic efficiency 
to the extent that price distortion results.307 Some scholars, however, 
ascribe to the “Pigouvian” theory, whereby the tax system can achieve 
economic efficiency by actually correcting market inefficiencies, such 
as positive and negative externalities.308 As such, a higher level of eco-
nomic efficiency is attained through the tax system than through im-
perfe
                                                                                                                     
ct, albeit natural, market activity.309 
A. Sunset Provisions Frustrate the Simplicity Goal of the Tax System 
 Sunset provisions make the tax code more complex, violating the 
simplicity goal, by increasing the costs of compliance and frustrating 
taxpayer understanding.310 Non-seamless extensions and retroactive 
renewals further impose administrative costs in the form of reissued tax 
forms.311 Also, the consistent threat of expiration creates transactional 
waste, as interest groups must lobby for extension to realize the benefits 
of the tax credit.312 For instance, the American Wind Energy Associa-
tion and other renewable energy companies frequently lobby for PTC 
renewal.313 Furthermore, temporal gaps result from expired and then 
 
304 Andrews, supra note 18, at 9; McDaniel, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
eld, Microeconomics 318–22 (1989) 
(ind
Economic Efficiency: How to Tax Our Way to Efficiency, 17 Va. Tax Rev. 
295
 (indicating that a tax can achieve economic 
effic
requent sunset provisions and the additional costs associated with those com-
plex
guing that temporary legislation does not necessar-
ily m
ote 5, at 8 
(sug ourage long-term investment). 
305 Andrews, supra note 18, at 9; McDaniel, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
306 Ronald C. Fisher, State and Local Public Finance 298–99 (3d ed. 2007). 
307 See Robert S. Pindyck & Daniel Rubinf
icating impact of taxes on buyers and sellers). 
308 Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 129 (Transaction Publishers 
2002 ed. 2001) (1920) (“[E]ven in the most advanced States there are failures and imper-
fections. . . . [T]here are many obstacles that prevent a community’s resources from being 
distributed . . . in the most effective way.”); Kneave Rigall, Comprehensive Tax Base Theory, 
Transaction Costs, and 
, 321 (1997). 
309 Batchelder et al., supra note 295, at 42
iency by correcting imperfect markets). 
310 Kysar, supra note 117, at 369 (illustrating the complexities of filing for taxes that are 
subject to f
ities). 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 393; cf. Gersen, supra note 113, at 263 (noting that increased transaction costs 
impact economic efficiency but also ar
ean increased transaction costs). 
313 See, e.g., 2001 Hearing, supra note 251, at 77–78; Wind Agenda, supra n
gesting a five-year renewal of the PTC to enc
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renewed sunsetting tax provisions, further complicating the code.314 
This has occurred with the PTC: the sunset provisions complicate the 
ve
C, particularly, has been 
amended seven times in the past fifteen years for renewals alone.317 
Furthermore, no ompanies this in-
ea
 Frequent sunsetting of the PTC also frustrates the vertical equity 
goa 319
in stment process for renewable energy because the credits are not 
certain until the project has been completed, such that additional care 
and expense must be taken to ensure to the degree possible that the 
project is placed in service prior to the sunset date.315 
 Sunset provisions complicate the code as a result of the potential 
multifarious amendments to substantive provisions each time the cred-
its must be renewed, which creates opportunities for changes in the 
economic incentives themselves.316 The PT
trade-off in enhanced equity acc
cr sed complication; in fact, the sunset provisions create inequity, as 
discussed in the following Section.318 
B. The Inequity of Sunset Provisions 
l of the tax system.  Sunset dates and the consistent need for re-
newal introduce more opportunity for lobbying, which inequitably ad-
                                                                                                                      
314 Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8. 
315 See, e.g., Wind Agenda, supra note 5, at 8 (indicating that frequent expirations dis-
cou
1, 59 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45) (renewing 
the 
s amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 38–39, 45 (West 2010)) (establishing the PTC ini-
tiall
rage renewable energy investment); Wiser et al., supra note 14, at 5 (establishing that 
sunsetting the PTC leads to a damaging “boom-and-bust” cycle of development); Riti, supra 
note 6, at 794–95 (establishing that the frequent expirations of the PTC have negative 
impacts on renewable energy investment). 
316 See supra notes 167–179 and accompanying text. 
317 American Relief and Reinvestment Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1101, 123 Stat. 115, 
319 (2009) (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2010)) (renewing the PTC for three years); 
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 201, 120 Stat. 2922, 2944 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45) (renewing the PTC for one year); Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1301, 119 Stat. 594, 986–87 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C.A. § 45) (renewing the PTC for two years); Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 313, 118 Stat. 1166, 1181 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45) 
(renewing the PTC for one year); Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-147, § 603, 116 Stat. 2
PTC for less than two years); Tax Relief Extension Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 
§ 507, 113 Stat. 1860, 1922 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 45) (renewing the PTC 
for two years); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1914, 106 Stat. 2776, 3020 
(codified a
y for six and a half years). 
318 See Donaldson, supra note 302, at 650–53 (establishing that complexity in the tax 
code may be a necessary evil when it achieves an equitable result); infra notes 320–335 and 
accompanying text (discussing the inequitable features of sunset provisions with respect to 
the PTC). 
319 See infra notes 320–335 and accompanying text. 
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vantages those who have more lobbying resources.320 Often, the re-
quirement for renewal creates a battle between special interest groups 
due to the budgetary rules.321 The pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) budgetary 
rules require that Congress match each increase to the deficit with a 
corresponding increase in revenue or decrease in deficit.322 As such, 
each renewal of a sunsetted PTC must be matched with a correspond-
ing elimination of tax credit/subsidy or an increase in tax revenue.323 
Therefore, different policies and special interests are often pitted 
against each other in this budgetary battle; frequently, the group with 
greater lobbying power prevails.324 For example, with respect to the 
sunsetted PTC, the renewable industry must be prepared to increase 
lobbying efforts each time a renewal date approaches and often must 
compete against the fossil fuel industry in this endeavor.325 In 2007, 
during an attempt to renew the PTC, the bill’s sponsors recommended 
repealing subsidies to more established energy industries, such as oil 
and gas.326 This prompted a strong backlash by the powerful supporters 
of the oil and gas industry, resulting in a failure to renew the PTC, de-
spite increased lobbying efforts.327 The inequitable treatment of the 
renewable energy industry with respect to tax benefits is also apparent 
through a budgetary analysis: the total cost of the production tax credit 
from 1994 to 2007 amounted to $2.7 billion and the amount of subsi-
ies d for fossil fuels in 2006 alone amounted to $49 billion.328 
                                                                                                                      
320 See Kysar, supra note 117, at 364, 392. Sunset provisions are mutually beneficial to 
lobbyists and members of Congress, as legislators continue to receive “rent” each time an 
expired provision is up for renewal and lobbyists maintain their jobs. See Kysar, Lasting 
Legi rs of Congress have expressed an af-
finit rovisions for this very reason. Id. 
r, supra note 117, at 347, 364, 392. 
quent renewal require-
men
gest-
ing t
16, 26, 40, 42, 
and  fact, President Bush threatened to veto legisla-
tion  subsidies. See Riti, supra note 6, at 799. 
l., supra note 14, at 12. 
slation, supra note 135, at 1043–44. Many membe
y towards sunset p
321 See Kysa
322 See id. at 347. 
323 See id. 
324 See Riti, supra note 6, at 798 (noting the necessity to pay for the PTC through off-
setting costs with reductions in fossil fuel subsidies). 
325 Kysar, supra note 117, at 347, 364, 392 (establishing that fre
ts introduce increased special interest groups and rent extraction); Riti, supra note 7, 
at 798 (relating a particularly contentious renewal battle in 2007). 
326 See 153 Cong. Rec. E151 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 2007) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt) (sug
hat renewal of the PTC and other measures and reduced fossil fuel subsidies would re-
sult in less energy security and harm to American businesses); Riti, supra note 6, at 798. 
327 Riti, supra note 6, at 798; see Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 
No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified in scattered sections of 1–2, 5, 7, 15–
 49 U.S.C.) (omitting PTC renewal). In
 that repealed oil and natural gas
328 Wiser et a
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 This result is contrary to Lowi’s theory that sunsetting legislation 
will weaken the power of special interest groups in the legislative proc-
ess— .329 
Lowi est 
grou ave 
intro rites 
of h
es across time, in the competition over 
 powerful oil and gas industries can divert more 
lobbying resources to win budgetary battles.334 Therefore, sunset provi-
sions violate the ver ake appropriate 
iffe
mits the tax system to fix 
market inefficiencies, and therefore a tax system may attain a higher 
     
instead, sunset dates enhance the role of special interest groups
 hypothesized that a periodic review would disrupt special inter
p influence.330 Sunsetting tax provisions in particular, however h
duced more special interest group influence.331 One scholar w
ow the increased presence of special interests results in inequity: 
Sunset provisions are problematic because they demand the 
expenditure of resources by interested parties on a continual 
basis (until, of course, the law is sunsetted). Thus, the well-
connected and well-resourced players have a significant ad-
vantage, which increas
sunsetted legislation. Indeed, the expansive use of sunset pro-
visions may lead to more tax legislation that, from the outset, 
benefits such well-financed players, because legislators will 
want to engage those interest groups that contribute upon 
each sunset date.332 
The experience of the PTC is inconsistent with Lowi’s theory of sunset 
dates.333 The PTC’s sunset dates increase special interest lobbying in-
equitably because the
tical equity principle by failing to m
d rences between taxpayers who are different; instead they inequita-
bly favor those with more resources to the detriment of the renewable 
energy industry.335 
C. Economic Inefficiencies of Sunset Dates 
 Sunset provisions in the PTC also violate the tax goal of economic 
efficiency.336 Again, the “Pigouvian” theory per
                                                                                                                 
329 Lowi, supra note 113, at 287. 
330 Id. at 309. 
 extraction leading to more special interest lobbying activity). 
e 117, at 393, and Riti, su-
pra 
fra notes 337–350 and accompanying text. 
331 Kysar, supra note 117, at 393 (establishing that sunset provisions result in more op-
portunities for rent
332 Id. 
333 Compare Lowi, supra note 113, at 287, with Kysar, supra not
note 6, at 798. 
334 See Riti, supra note 6, at 798. 
335 See Kysar, supra note 117, at 393; Riti, supra note 6, at 798. 
336 See in
2011] Sunsetting and the Production Tax Credit 1145 
le  of economic efficiency than an imperfect, albeit natural, mar-
ket.
vel
such 
er
rm investment and therefore frustrate the externality-
corr re-
newa nd 
           
337 One such inefficiency can be the failure of the market to correct 
for externalities or divergences between the private costs of an activity 
and the social costs of an economic activity.338 
 The PTC, by incentivizing the production of renewable energy, 
promotes efficiency because of the uncorrected positive externalities in 
the renewable energy market and negative externalities of non-
renewable energy.339 The positive externalities of renewable energy 
production include cleaner, domestic energy sources for electricity, and 
increased job growth.340 These social returns of renewable energy ar-
guably dwarf the monetary returns of investment, because high costs 
and risks frustrate the profitability of renewable energy projects.341 As 
such, the production tax credit achieves economic efficiency by “paying 
for” those positive externalities through a deduction in income tax li-
ability.342 Furthermore, pollution from non-renewable energy sources 
creates negative externalities because the negative social costs of envi-
ronmental degradation diverge from the cost of production for 
en gy.343 Therefore, incentivizing renewable energy through tax cred-
its leads to a more efficient outcome by accounting for such positive 
and negative externalities and closing the divergence between these 
costs/benefits and the cost of production of renewable energy.344 
 Sunset provisions, however, undermine this economic efficiency 
and decrease the potential social benefits attained by the PTC.345 They 
frustrate these market-correcting features of the PTC, as they discour-
age long-te
ecting potential of the tax credit.346 Furthermore, the price of 
ble energy will reflect this uncertainty, increasing the price a
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338 See Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 17–18; Batchelder et al., supra note 
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341 See Joint Committee Report, supra note 3, at 17–18; supra notes 40–52 and ac-
panying text (establishing the social and environmental benefits of renewable energy). 
342 See 25 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2010); Joint Commit
343 Joint C
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sults in higher capital costs and pricing of renewable energy); Kysar,
icating increased transaction costs of sunsetted tax provisions). 
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Thus, not only is the uncert vailability transferred to the 
price of renewable energy, b costs of capital and industry 
an
 whole harmed. 
The LIHTC serves as an important example of how perm
                                                                                                                     
easing the efficiency-promoting function of the credit.347 One
 writes: 
[W]e can capture economic efficiency gains by permitting 
taxpayers to count on [the credit’s] continued availability. . . . 
[The reflection of uncertainty in price] is a phenomenon 
clearly visible, for example, in the wind and solar power indus-
tries, which rely on a “temporary” tax subsidy for their 
tence. Industry participants, including suppliers like wind tur-
bine manufacturers, are subject to violent swings of fortune as 
the fate of the subsidy periodically teeters: the result is that the 
industry is smaller, and its cost of capital is higher, than would 
be true if there were greater certainty in the program.
ainty of PTC a
ut also to the 
m ufacturing.349 Therefore, the credit’s ability to account for positive 
externalities, and hence to promote economic efficiency, is offset by 
the increased uncertainty costs to a renewable project.350 
Conclusion 
 The permanent extension of the PTC is necessary to promote re-
newable energy in the United States and to achieve President Obama’s 
goal of “reinventing” the nation’s clean energy economy. The frequent 
expiration of the PTC through sunset provisions of the PTC, by con-
trast, impedes these ends. Congress rationalizes PTC sunset provisions 
on political gain and budgetary manipulation alone; they are not offset 
by any countervailing tax policy. In fact, sunset dates frustrate all fun-
damental goals of tax collection. The financial incentive of the PTC 
spurs investment in renewable energy, making it cost-competitive with 
non-renewable energy sources. Investors and those in the renewable 
energy industry, therefore, require certainty with regards to the PTC’s 
continued existence. Without such certainty, renewable projects will be 
substantially reduced and the renewable industry as a
anency can 
 
347 Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23–24. 
348 Id. 
349 See id. 
350 See Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 23 (establishing that frequent sunset provisions in 
the PTC lead to increased capital costs ); Kysar, supra note 117, at 369 (illustrating the 
complexities of filing for taxes that are subject to frequent sunset provisions and the addi-
tional costs associated with those complexities). 
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positively affect the incentivizing feature of a tax credit. For the forego-
ing reasons, Congress should heed the renewable industry’s recom-
mendation to permanently extend the PTC in the interest of realizing 
the social and economic benefits of renewable energy. 
Erin Dewey 
